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The Middle East represents a region constantly engaged in multi-dimensional, complex 
conflicts involving the issues such as ideology, religion, ethnicity, territory, history, and 
others.
One of these conflicts is that between the Jewish and Arab people which took the violent 
form after the official establishment of Israel in 1948. This dissertation looks at the Arab 
perspective of the conflict, particularly, at the dynamics of the frontline states’ (Syria, Jordan, 
Lebanon, and Egypt) positions in the Arab-Israeli rivalry, and the factors which influenced it. 
The conceptual approach involves historical overview and periodization of the conflict. 
These approaches allowed seeing the circumstances under which certain stances had been 
taken in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict; these circumstances stand as the factors of 
change in dynamics. The analysis of the dynamics is based on the key assumptions of the 
realist theory of international relations such as centrality of the sovereign states and their self- 
interests, security dimension, and the relations of states determined by the relative levels of 
power, both economic and military. In addition, the concept of “balance of power” of game 
theory is used to aid the understanding of the central question.
The study showed two major trends in the development of the Arab states’ positions. First, is 
the shift from the ideology-based, ethno-national approach to the conflict, to the pragmatic, 
economically, and strategically-based considerations with the recognition of Israel, implying 
the realist vision of the conflict by the states. Second, is the strong connection between the 
development of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the search by the Arab states for the regional 
order and the basis for inter-Arab relation, which stands as an important factor on the way to 
the states’ effective policies in settling the conflict with Israel.
Chapter 1. 
Introduction
As described by Lesch and Tschigri (1998), the Middle East has long been an area of 
brilliant civilizations and severe conflicts. Due to the region’s strategic location it had 
attracted the attention of different powers to “seize its valuable territory” (ibid: 3).
It has faced conflicts between different countries and cultures, ideologies and 
religions. Even though now it seems that the highest tensions are subsided by the 
efforts of direct and indirect participants it still attracts world attention and is a “staple 
of the world news” (Yehuda, Sandler, 2002).
One of the most outstanding and devastating conflicts in the region has been the one 
between the Israeli people and their Arab neighbors.
The Balfour Declaration proposed in 1917 by the British Foreign Secretary Arthur J. 
Balfour calling for the establishment of the national Jewish home in Palestine was a 
triumph for the Zionist diplomacy and the realization of the dream of the Jewish 
people who had longed for their home for many centuries (Shlaim, 2000: 7). The 
realization of the Declaration into reality came with the establishment of the Jewish 
State of Israel in 1948, after passing by the United Nations of the Resolution 181 in 
favor of the partition of Palestine into the Jewish and Arab states (ibid: 25) causing 
the major discontent among the existing non-Jewish community in Palestine, 
especially the Palestinian Arabs that reflected in the deterioration of the Arab-Jewish 
relations. The Palestine Arabs rejected the Plan, the action supported also by the Arab 
League. This was the reflection of the “savage war between the two communities in 
Palestine” (ibid: 27). This attitude turned into the war of independence, when on May 
15, 1948 the regular armies o f Egypt, Transjordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq invaded 
Palestine. The war showed the weakness and disorganization of the Arab army. 
Moreover, it served as a sign of the weak Arab solidarity and divergence in the Arab 
aims in relation to the State of Israel. The Arab states took the Palestinian question to
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be their inter-Arab and internal affair and they used it as a means for achieving their 
own interests.
The Arab countries were determined “to destroy the newborn Jewish state and cast 
the Jews into the sea” (ibid: 35-36). Jordan with the King Abdullah, had as his aim 
making “himself the master of the Arab part of Palestine”, and Syria intended to 
dominate the region. The Arab states are sometimes considered to be in most respects 
more fundamental to the conflict than the Palestinians, who transformed a local 
communal conflict into an international issue (D. Pipes, Foreign Affairs, Fall 1991). 
The conflict represents the interplay of different factors and actors. “It is the 
multiissue, or multidimensional conflict. The attitudes and policies of each 
participating parties were molded by its own history and system of internal forces and 
pressures as well as by its interests. These in turn influenced those parties’ grievances 
and ambitions, and the means they used in order to improve or remedy them. As the 
interests changed over time, so did the policies designed to take care of them” 
(Rubinstein, 1991: 195).
The crisis meant different things for different people. For the Arabs the creation of 
Israel in an Arab land was an act of aggression and her survival had been seen as a 
continuous act of aggression, therefore any action taken by the Arabs against Israel 
was seen as defensive and any attempt by Israel to resist or oppose such action as 
aggressive (Lewis, 2004: 297-98).
The conflict has taken many forms. The clash has been military, political and 
economic. For instance, through the League of Arab States established in 1945, Arab 
countries organized a boycott of international companies that traded with Israel. 
Conversely, Israeli diplomats and pro-Israeli lobbyists strove to persuade American 
policy-makers to deny arms and economic aid to Arab states considered friendly to 
the United States during the Cold War era (Hinnebusch, 2003: 218).
There are many views on the conflict both in the literature and in the speeches and 
declarations of officials and organizations, and in general in the world opinion. It is 
obvious that the conflict has subsided during the most recent years however it still 
keeps the region a hot-bed and poses political, social and economic instability for the 
states.
The war of 1948 following the establishment of Israel, ended in the defeat of the Arab 
armies and the erasure o f the name Palestine form the map. The order established on 
the territory of Palestine was determined by the State of Israel becoming the status
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quo power (established by the armistice agreements signed by Israel with Egypt, 
Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria after the first half of 1949) (ibid: 54).
This phase in the Arab-Israeli relations immediately after the war culminated in the 
second Arab-Israeli war in June 1967 (here the mention should be made that this war 
is counted as the third Arab-Israeli war, since the second one was the Sinai campaign; 
however in the context of this dissertation the Sinai war of 1956 is not touched upon 
for it did not bring much conceptual impact on the Arab-Israeli relations and it stands 
outside the time-frame concerned).
The Arab states called Israel in the preamble to their decision in the Cairo Summit of 
the Arab League in 1964, “the basic threat to the Arab nation in its entirety... if 
necessary results are not achieved, collective Arab military preparations, when they 
are completed, will constitute the ultimate practical means for the final liquidation of 
Israel” (Shlaim, 2000: 229), thus for the first time collectively declaring an official 
document with the aim of destruction of the State of Israel. This was the beginning of 
a new era both for Israel and her Arab neighbors, the one of uncertainty and open 
hostility.
During the earlier years the conflict was characterized by the Arab world’s “refusal 
to come to grips with the broader question of existence of the State of Israel. Many 
states perceived the creation of a Jewish state and the displacement of the Palestinian 
Arabs as two sides of the same coin” (A. D. Miller, 1986: 9).
The first two decades of the conflict were notable for Arab refusal to recognize 
Israel’s existence. Following the 1967 War the attitude started to change, however, 
without resisting the ideological rigidity and representing the “frozen diplomacy” 
period (phrase used by Shlaim, 2000) correlating to the “Three No’s” of Khartoum 
Arab summit conference in 1967(no negotiation, no recognition, no peace with Israel) 
though making implications that they would explore the possibilities o f making peace 
with Israel.
Since the 1970s the conflict started to give way to the more orderly regime of conflict 
management (Yehuda and Sandler, 2002). The war that took place in 1973 (called the 
October War, or the Yom Kippur War, or Ramadan War, known in the Arab world 
(Kamrava, 2005: 131) marked the turning point in the rivalry between the two people 
and put it on the way of formation of the more realist attitudes of the actors and 
opened the channels for negotiation and settlement.
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The period until the 1973 Yom Kippur War (when Egypt and Syria launched the 
attack of Israel in Sinai Peninsular and the Golan Heights with the aim of recovering 
of those territories respectively) was the one of little diplomatic activity and the one 
with the strong identity and ideology based policies towards Israel. The imbalance in 
power as well as the political differences between Israel and its Arab neighbors was 
so extreme that meaningful negotiations proved to be impossible (Lesch and Tschirgi, 
1998). The Arab states maintained the stance of regaining all of their lands and 
refused any negotiations without the fulfillment by Israel of the major Arab demands, 
implying the return to the borders of 4 June 1967 and the establishment of an 
independent Palestinian state. The notion of the Palestinian state was introduced by 
the Arab states for issuing to the United Nations Security Council and adopted as an 
official stance by the majority (Noam Cnomsky. Perspective on the Palestinian-Israeli 
issue. Palestine-Israel, USA, Politics, 12/26/2005: left view on the issue, which 
reflects in general the tendency to see Israel as an “expansionist” state and calls for 
the stronger international condemnation of Israeli policy and supervision of the 
implementation of its withdrawal to the pre-occupied areas and realization of 
Palestinian political and national rights by establishing of the Palestinian state as the 
eventual outcome of the Arab-Israeli conflict, supported by the Arab states).
According to many analysts, in the mid-1970s ideologically and ethnically rooted 
policies came into the process of giving way to pragmatically motivated approaches 
on both parts (Lesch and Tschirgi, 1998, p. 107). In the 1970s, economic relations 
with the West and with the United States in particular became a primary factor in the 
decisions of Arab states to pursue diplomatic negotiations and peaceful relations with 
Israel (Kober, 2002: 142).
With the continuous decline of pan-Arab ideologies (Houráni, 2002, Kober, 2002: 
46), the commitment of individual Arab states to policy guidelines derived from a 
collective “Arab identity” followed by the decrease in the hostility of Arabs toward 
Israel.
Economic development was a more important challenge and a more realistic 
undertaking than the elusive quest for pan-Arab unity or the liberation of historic 
Palestine (Meller, 1986: 5).
As Egypt, the regional hegemon, decided to withdraw from confrontation line with 
Israel, it had a “sobering impact on most regimes’ view of their role in the conflict” 
(A. D. Miller, 1986: 10).
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According to Kober (2002), economic factors also were one of the most important 
after the resumption of the peace talks after the Madrid Conference in 1991 and 
following agreements and negotiations.
Up until the end of the 1980s, the calculations of the states’ interests were based on 
the judgments of their power relative to that of their rivals. This fact both encouraged 
peace and fostered alliances aimed at neutralizing if not breaking the might of rival 
states (R. Hinnebusch, 2003: 218). The alliances created between the states often 
served to counterpose the Israeli military might thus creating the heightened security 
environment and hindering the settlement of the conflict (Kober, 2002). The 
insecurity feelings of some states (e.g. Syria) encouraged their militarization and 
separate diplomacy (R. Hinnebusch, 2003: 163).
The end of the Cold War and disappearance of the Soviet Union left the only external 
player in the region, that is the USA, and weakened the material capabilities of the 
Arab countries which were the Soviet Union clients. Moreover, the Gulf War in 1991 
showed that the whole Middle East was characterized by substantial instability which 
especially can be referred to the Arab countries both in the area of interstate relations 
and instability of regimes of the nation-states (Spiegel; Rienner, 1992: 18). This 
period in time posed the dilemma to the Arab countries in having to choose between 
their long-standing and basic anti-Israeli policy and their particular interests. In a 
way, some of the major Arab countries were siding with Israel against an Arab 
brother country (ibid: 19). The need for an urgent search for a political solution 
increased, and without doubt it had an impact on modifying the Jordanian position 
that time, for instance, and explains Amman's readiness to join the process (ibid: 19). 
Egypt was reinstated as a regional power and put at the helm of Arab politics.
In the beginning of the 1990s it was difficult to give a definite answer as to what 
future expected the conflict and the region in general. Many analysts and mediators 
pointed to the reality of the conflict with the structural asymmetry, where Israel had 
the perception of having to cope with her enemies and her suspicion was that reaching 
agreement with one of them would not necessarily deliver the other adversaries to the 
negotiating table (Rubinstein, 1991: 24). To the Arabs, Israel was still a formidable 
expansionist military enemy that threatened them. Therefore the recognition of Israel 
was seen by them as a negotiating asset which they did not want to show at the first 
stages of negotiations (ibid: 24).
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“Today Israel, Jordan, Egypt, the PLO recognize each others’ right to exist and 
legitimacy for peace, despite the disagreements concerning certain practical issues. 
The relations of Israel and the Arab actors stands a good chance of becoming ever 
more solidly based on pragmatic considerations of national interest rather than being 
afflicted by ideological differences” (Lesch and Taschirg, 1998: 38). Even if there is a 
possibility between Israel and particular states (namely Syria) for the armed conflict 
remains it is not likely for the foreseeable future (Ben-Meir, 1994; Barry Rubin, 
1998). According to Osama El-Ghazali Harb the comprehensive settlement appears 
inevitable (A1 Ahram Weekly, 14-20 September, 2000, issue no. 499), and Arab- 
Israeli war is less likely than at any time during the last half-century (Rubin, 1998). 
The decline of the conflict is attributed to several factors, one of which is the nature 
of the Arab states’ formation and paths o f decision-making. Since 1990s it became 
clear that the states’ reversed their thinking on the conflict which was precipitated by 
various conditions. First of all, the attention is paid to the relaxing of the radical 
regimes (though not their disappearance) and the realization of importance of the 
material gains rather than ideological chase. Attention is also drawn to the domestic 
problems of the states and inter-Arab tensions which the regimes have been unable to 
address in a productive way. Barry Rubin explains the issue by saying that “the 
conflict engaged more Arab rhetoric than action, partly because it was easier to rail at 
Israel than to address difficult domestic problems or inter-Arab conflicts. Each Arab 
regime manipulated the issue for its own interests, accusing others of being too soft 
on Israel. Within states, rulers and opposition accused each other of being Zionist or 
Western agents. Syria claimed the land in dispute as its property. Jordan asserted 
ownership of the West Bank; Lebanese Christians tried to win a civil war with Israeli 
help” (Middle East Journal, September, 1998).
The internal economic problems of the Arab states and high costs of the conflict 
pushed most Arab states to reduce gradually their involvement on the Arab-Israeli 
issue, being unwilling to wage war and unready to make peace (ibid). Even though 
there are many unresolved mutual issues, the attention draws itself to other parts of 
the region including Iraqi problem, the growing spread of radical Islam and terrorist 
organizations. These issues can invest in the regional instability, however, which can 
express themselves in internal nation-state crises of the states. The latter can be added 
by still present quest for regional domination but that is highly unlikely to evolve into 
a major armed Arab-Israeli confrontation but rather remain on the verbal and
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diplomatic level. Besides, as is noted by the US National Security Advisor Tony Lake 
(quoted in Rubin, 1998) there is a tendency that the radical regimes are 
counterbalanced by the moderate ones: “the extremists will be denied the claim that 
they are the wave of the future. They will have to confront the reality o f their failure 
[while moderate] governments find the strength to counter extremism at home as well 
as abroad.”
Apart from the bilateral Arab-Israeli disputes, on the general Arab-Israeli level of the 
conflict the main issue of most of the Arab states is the search for the ways for 
solution and the settlement of the conflict rather than the issue of the recognition or 
rejection of Israel, which also points at the changed Arab ideological rhetoric into the 
pragmatic approach.
Perhaps the most problematic issue in the Arab-Israeli relations is the Syrian 
question.
Because this is the state that first of all stays as a regional power and has been central 
to the Arab-Israeli conflict. According to Daniel Pipes, “so long as Syria refuses to 
come to terms with Israel, the conflict continues.” Now in Syria there is the 
realization that it faces the impossibility of attacking Israel; however, it sees the 
disadvantages in agreement with Israel: “Syria is uninterested in reaching agreement 
since even one meeting virtually all its demands would severely damage its interests. 
Unable to use Israel as a threat, Syria would have a hard time obtaining aid, or 
influencing Arab counsels. Any diplomatic solution would increase U.S. influence; 
favor Egypt, Israel, and Jordan over Syria; block Syrian influence on the Palestinians; 
and make Israel a stronger rival” (Rubin, September 1998). The question remains 
hard to resolve, especially when it comes to the most important Syrian-Israeli dispute 
on the Golan Heights occupied by Israel during 1967 War formerly belonging to 
Syria, and representing the region of vital importance to both countries; the issue 
remains the subject of speculations on both sides.
Overall, the diplomatic positions of the “radical group” of states have been changed 
to that of a more flexible approach and all of the most interested states realize the 
advantage of cooperation with Israel, with the obstacles based on the technical and bi­
lateral issues.
By the end of the 1990s the debate as to whether the time was due and the prospects 
were promising for the final settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Arab 
states’ readiness towards accepting Israel and all the rights of the state without her
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facing real threats from the Arab neighbors, came to the fore. Many considered and 
think now that the conflict became the anachronism, and the optimism became the 
policy (D. Pipes, Washington Times, March 16, 1994). Barry Rubin argued in 1998 
that the “conflict was over”, and that the Arab states realized the impossibility of its 
continuation. However, the pessimists pointed to the fact that despite the doubtless 
fact that over recent decades the Arab disposition towards Israel has changed in 
significant ways, in some quarters the hatred to Israel had not ceased (ibid). The 
analysts pointed to the Arab rejectionism in its various forms and the role still 
actively played by visions, loves and hatreds (ibid). Besides, it is also noticed that the 
public opinion within the Arab states is still hostile towards Israel, despite their 
leaders’ public rhetoric on the peace.
The debate continues that even if the states realize all the advantages of good 
relations with Israel and therefore the West, with the following financial and material 
aid, the threat of loosing the legitimacy of the Arab regimes overweighs this. Sasley 
attributed the importance of the Arab-Israeli conflict for the Arab states as the one of 
importance for securing their regime: “as the peace process removes Israel as an 
external enemy or threat, growing demands for greater political liberalization, even 
democratization, will grow within Arab states, thus putting at risk the positions of 
power, perhaps even security or safety, of Arab rulers” (Sasley, 2002).
There are no clear answers to whether the Arab countries are genuinely ready to 
accept Israel as an equal enemy and take up the comprehensive steps towards the 
settlement of the most important issues for both sides. The existing evidence suggests 
different views, both analyzing the official positions o f the rulers and the internal 
situations within countries (economic, social, and political), together with public 
opinion.
Hence, this dissertation looks at the development and change of the Arab states’ 
positions and attitudes during the Arab-Israeli conflict and towards the State of Israel, 
and the factors that influenced the dynamics. Therefore the central question is: What 
were the dynamics o f the Arab states positions in the Arab-Israeli conflict after the 




Methodology and Theoretical Background
In order to elaborate and discover the issues relating to the central question of how 
the Arab states changed there positions during the Arab-Israeli conflict in relation to 
it and the State of Israel, what factors have been influencing this change and with 
what result on the overall conflict I chose to deal with the period of immediately after 
the 1967 Six Day War up to the post 1991 years till the recent times. The choice of 
this period is conditioned by the fact that 1967 was a decisive date in that it pointed to 
the realization by the Arab countries of their military weaknesses and realization of 
the changed order in the region of the Middle East and the changed circumstances in 
which the states now needed to formulate their policies. It was the order of the 
stabilization of the status quo in the area in favor of Israel. Now the latter became an 
indispensable part of the political and strategic lives of the states of the region, which 
influenced both internal and inter-state, and inter-regional relations.
Besides, after the 1967 War, “the Arab’s commitment to confront Israel militarily 
increased in the hope of rectifying the humiliating military defeat and regaining 
possession of the territories lost during that war” (Kober, 2002: 88). Besides, Arab- 
Israeli conflict was set in motion, and despite still present rejectionist stances of the 
Arab states in relation to the State of Israel, the latter was admitted as a political 
entity and existing reality, even if the one which had to be fought with. During this 
period the conflict started to be conceptualized by the Arab states as a dispute over 
the borders and they focused on the economic, military and diplomatic means for 
restoring these territories (ibid: 88).
For the sake of convenience, the period post-1967 is virtually divided into three 
periods, which are described in the literature on the topic in an unconceptualized way 
as the ones that witnessed the events that made the countries rethink (though not 
always in radical ways) and reformulate their rhetoric and policy-making in the
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context of the Arab-Israeli conflict. These periods are from 1967 till the October War 
of 1973 (or Ramadan War, the term used in the Arab world, or Yom Kippur War), 
when the fight with Israel was based much on the ideological premises and it was 
related to the “frozen diplomacy” phase when little had been done in the positive 
direction. The 1973 war served as a “sobering effect” on the states and allowed the 
ideological rigidity to transform into a more realist approach towards the positioning 
and actions taken towards Israel; and the third one dealing with the period post -1990, 
when the conflict no longer took place in the context of the Cold War rivalry with the 
collapse o f the Soviet Union and thus defining the new priorities of the states and 
consequently, rethinking of official and unofficial alliances, formulating new strategic 
thinking and considering more pragmatic stances. The latter was also influenced by 
the Gulf War of 1991 and corresponding coalitions during the crisis and pointing to 
the “new opening and need for the Arab-Israeli peace” (Morris, 1999).
The division into periods gives the opportunity of having a look at the dynamics of 
the Arab states positions, with different factors in specific periods of time influencing 
these dynamics. The last part which deals with the post-1990 period will help to see 
the changed attitudes and the degree to which Arab states are ready during the recent 
years towards accepting the permanent peaceful settlement with Israel.
Here, the clarification should be made in what is meant by the “Arab states”. Since 
the dissertation is concerned with the Arab perspective of this conflict, the states to 
which the reference is made are the “frontline states”, or the “confrontation states” of 
Jordan, Syria, Egypt and Lebanon. The term “frontline states” is often used in the 
literature on the Arab-Israeli conflict (e.g. Miller, 1986; Barnett, 1998; Kober, 2002) 
due to those states’ immediate proximity to Israel and the direct interest in the 
conflict, because all of these states (except Lebanon) lost their territories to Israel and 
had internal crises influenced by the conflict. All of these states have significant 
number of Palestinian refugees o f both 1948 and 1967 wars, therefore making the 
Palestinian issue salient in their priorities as a part of the overall Arab-Israeli dispute, 
and which is used by the Arab states in their own interests, without letting the 
refugees to settle down. Besides, all of these countries had both direct armed and 
ideological and political confrontation with Israel. As Rubinstein (1991: 75) notes, “it 
is them who have borne the brunt of the Arab wars with Israel, they who have the 
most at stake, and they who most affect the course and character of the conflict.” 
These countries were the major actors during the peace negotiations at different times
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and at these states Israel aimed when seeking a partner for negotiating agreements 
and as the main states when concerned its own security. Hence, these countries are 
given the special attention in analyzing the issues connected with the central question 
of the dissertation, however other states such as Saudi Arabia (which twice proposed 
the plan for the settlement throughout the conflict), Iran, Iraq and some other 
countries are mentioned when discussing the coalitions o f these countries and inter- 
Arab disputes which had an impact on the Arab-Israeli conflict. For instance, Iraq, 
Saudi Arabia and Israel have never shot a single bullet at each other (except Iraqi 
Gulf War campaign) but the former had influenced the “frontline states’” policies 
towards the latter and they had “un-armed” conflict. As concerns Saudi Arabia, its 
importance gained in weight in the 1970s with its enormously enhanced military 
capability (Rubinstein, 1991: 75). Besides, the involvement of the ‘non-core states’ 
(that is the states of the Fertile Crescent, including Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and 
Palestine (Miller, 1986; Sela, 1998) is explained by their attempts to demonstrate the 
active involvement in the Palestine conflict or in conciliation and mediation of efforts 
between disputing core actors (Sela, 1998: 16). Like this, besides Saudi Arabia, 
Morocco can be distinguished among those states, when it was the intermediary 
during the negotiations between Egypt and Israel leading to their peace treaty. Or 
Libya’s hyper-nationalist policies against Israel and the West, and the Gulf 
monarchies’ official financial aid to the confrontation states and the PLO (ibid: 16). 
When it comes to the Palestinian issue it is not discussed separately but when 
concerns the Arab states’ attitudes towards the latter and its role in taking decisions. 
Throughout the conflict the question of Palestine constituted the pivotal role and was 
manipulated by the Arab regimes in order to mobilize public opinion, justify different 
moves done by these states and reach the aims set by them. Hence, the Palestinian 
question is not discussed separately as an aspect of the overall conflict but within the 
context of the Arab decision-making, and as a factor of internal Arab countries’ crises 
and tensions, which had the influence on the going of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The 
relations o f the PNA (Palestinian National Authority) and Israel and Arab-Palestinian 
relations are not discussed in detail either but as the way the Arab states viewed the 
Palestinian problem and the degree to which they absorbed it as a part of their overall 
policies both internal, between each other and in relation to Israel. This is not, 
however to say, that the Palestinian issue is given less prominence in the discussion 
of the overall Arab-Israeli conflict, but just to say that the PLO and its fractions are
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viewed as an important factor in the states’ decision-taking and the direction of their 
resources. In addition, the explanation should be given to that it is not undermined 
that the question of Palestinian self-determination and the creation of the Palestinian 
state played the crucial role in the conflict, and continues to constitute one of the 
pivotal demands of the Arab states (the second one is territorial question). However, 
this issue is dealt with from the angle of the Arab states’ attitudes to what had been 
suggested in order to reach its solution and how they constructed their further stances 
in negotiation given these conditions.
In addition, the classifications and groupings of the Arab states into different “camps” 
are used in order to show the role o f ideology for different states and the points that 
were common for the states that halted or advanced the Arab-Israeli settlement. It is 
essential to differentiate between the radical and moderate states in its importance 
when analyzing the Arab-Israeli rapprochements or divergence. At the recent stages 
of the conflict the radical states pose the greatest problem and concern especially in 
the light of their arms capabilities and hard-line internal regimes that threat the 
regional stability.
Radical stances of states invest in the halting of the peace process, and make the 
impasse in further developments. For example, Syria is related to the radical stance, 
and it is considered the most important state in the Arab-Israeli conflict (especially 
after the peace agreement of Israel and Egypt in 1979) and without Syria the full- 
scale peace process is considered by many analysts as unrealistic.
The radical states tended to confront and change the established status quo order; the 
“moderates” showed more willingness for cooperation with Israel, though due to 
various reasons (economic, social and political) had to stick to the common positions. 
Nevertheless these positions were not “frozen” throughout the conflict and the states 
adapted to the existing circumstances. So, for instance, in the mid- 1970s, Egypt, 
from a radical position turned to the more pragmatic stance by rapprochement with 
Israel and joining the “moderate” such as Jordan, or during the Gulf War in 1991, 
Syria joined now moderate Egypt in coalition against Iraq while Jordan found itself 
on the other side of coalitions.
As it is the multi-token conflict different moves on different sides had repercussions 
in the overall Arab-Israeli dispute, therefore of importance are the inter-Arab 
coalitions during the conflict or as Rubinstein terms them “Arab World’s cold war”, 
its division into camps, which was characteristic of the 1950s and 1960s, and the
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fragmentation of the Arab world into states which were concerned primarily with 
their own narrowly defined interests (Rubinstein, 1991: 195). These intra-Arab 
alliances and rivalries also profoundly affected the Arab-Israeli conflict. The quest of 
certain states and their leaders for domination and leadership was the feature that cast 
its influence on the decisions and positions taken. As Ibn Khaldun, the Arab historian 
(quoted in Rubinstein, 1991: 75) wrote: “every Arab is eager to be the leader. 
Scarcely a one of them would cede his power to another. . . The Arabs are the lest 
willing of nations to subordinate themselves to each other, as they are rude, proud, 
ambitious, and eager to be the leader. Their individual aspirations rarely coincide.” 
This sheds the light on why their attempts at unity in most cases ended in not very 
successful enterprises, and also the tendency of certain states to take up realistic 
stances diverging from the often used, especially earlier in the conflict, pan-Arab 
postulates.
When trying to analyze the states’ positions and actual actions in the conflict, one 
needs to pay attention to the issues concerning the specificities of the Arab policy­
making, historical standing and legacy, and inter-Arab relations. These represent 
important elements in explaining the events and the reactions to them, decisions taken 
in relation to those events and the following outcomes.
With the changing course of the Arab-Israeli conflict the debate went on whether the 
pursuit of national interest tended to be a greater stimulus to an Arab state’s policy 
than pan-Arabism, an important aspect in analyzing the Arab-Israeli conflict.
The Arab nationalism expressed in pan-Arabic movement became the indispensable 
part of the Arab states since their establishment as independent units, gaining its 
importance in the 1950s -1960s. The Arab leaders relied heavily on Arab nationalism 
to legitimate their rule firsthand, and justify their actions and the norms of Arabism 
(Barnett, 1998). According to Barnett (1998) the Arab leaders were in a social 
situation defined by mutual dependence because of their shared identity and like this 
gaining the social approval that came being associated with Arabism (ibid).
The nationalist movement in the region represented the unique structure. Hinnebusch 
(2001: 153) pointed to the fact that “the Middle East stands out because of its unique 
combination of both strong sub-state identities and powerful supra-state identities, 
that together dilute and limit the mass loyalty to the state typical where it corresponds 
to a sense of nation distinctive from the ‘other’ (neighboring states).”
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The basic concept of pan-Arab movement was related to the ideology and rhetoric of 
pan-Arab nationalism. Pan- Arab ideology was directed against the institution of the 
nation-state in the Arab world. The basic belief underlying pan- Arab rhetoric was 
that all Arabs share everything on all levels and therefore needed to be unified under 
one, centrally governed nation-state (Tschirgi, Rienner, 1994: 135).
Avi Kober (2002: 41) points out that pan-Arab ideology reflected, and to some 
degree, reflects today, though in a lesser part, a Middle Eastern reality of state-to- 
nation ratio. At the initial stages of the movement development, it challenged the 
legitimacy of the nation-state, propagating the notion of an all-Arab nationalism 
(qawmiyya) unifying the Arab nation (umma). Pan-Arabism emphasized the belief 
that all Arabs belonged to one nation and the transcendence of Arabism over state 
boundaries (Kober, 2002: 41). The regional Arab system has always concentrated 
around the two issues, especially during the interwar period, and after the 
establishment of the States of Israel. According to Sela, “the emergence of a Jewish 
state in the heart of the Arab homeland and House of Islam {dar al-islam), in 
conjunction with other regional processes, played a central role in formation of pan- 
Arab nationalism and the crystallization of the Arab regional system. The reference to 
Israel’s territory as Palestine represents a powerful Arab-Islamic claim for its 
liberation, underlying the perception that Israel is “in but not of the region” (Sela, 
1998: 15).
The Arab political consciousness had been shaped by the themes of pan-Arabism and 
anti-colonialism that impacted the states’ relations with Israel and their positions in 
the conflict.
Freedman (1979: 90) looks at the kind of dilemma faced by different Arab states 
during the conflict. He points that the reaction of the Arab states toward the conflict 
with Israel reflected the struggle between the national interest and that of the pan- 
Arab one. Freedman continues that to proponents of pan-Arabism, Israel was 
perceived as a foreign entity in the midst of the Arab world, which must be removed 
if Arab unity was to be achieved. Here the Palestinian cause became important 
touchstone of Pan-Arabism, and every Arab was required to aid the Palestinian Arabs 
against Israel (Freedman, 1979: 1979).
This theme was often interpreted by the states in the light of their historical 
experience making the Palestinian question significant for them.
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To the Arab leader thinking primarily o f his own country’s interests, Israel was seen 
as a military powerful state, whose existence was supported by both superpowers, and 
with whom continued conflict was an increasingly costly and dangerous process 
which needed to be avoided wherever possible (Freedman, 1979: 90), thus indicating 
the realist approach.
The Arab leaders in many cases were aware that selfless national dedication to the 
Palestinian cause would lead immediately to a confrontation with Israel that no Arab 
states could win alone, even with support of several others. “Nasser urged his people 
to make considerable sacrifices for the Palestinians, resentment over which ultimately 
helped pave the way for Sadat’s action- his ‘Egypt first’ policy” (Bill, Springboard, 
1999: 225).
The same dichotomy in the Arab states’ relation towards the Palestinian issue is 
reflected by Miller (1986: 3), who distinguishes between the ideal, emotional level 
and the concrete level. In the first case the states “tended to respond collectively, 
rallying around time-honored and sometimes genuinely held slogans of Arab unity, 
independence, and support for the Palestinian rights. Here the ‘Arab world’ as a 
whole had a duty to bound the injustices foisted upon Palestinians, Arabs and 
Muslims by a Zionist movement backed by a colonialist West” (Miller, 1986: 3). In 
the second case the Arab states reacted not in response to an idealized conception of a 
pan-Arab commitment to furthering the Palestinian cause, but individually, according 
to how each perceived its own interests. Here the Palestinian cause and the PLO 
(Palestine Liberation Organization, made official representative of the Palestinian 
people during the Arab Summit in Rabbat in 1974, the role played by Jordan before) 
were perceived in a more sober light: as a potential threat to these states, or as an 
opportunity to validate their pan-Arab credentials, outbid their rivals, and rally or 
distract domestic opinion. This approach, as noted by Miller, was more consistent 
with the realities with which the regimes had to deal (Miller, 1986: 4). According to 
Freedman (1979: 90), in this second situation the Palestinian cause was one worthy of 
support, but not at the cost of his own country’s welfare. National interests 
constituted one of the forces that influenced the Arab decision-making, especially 
after the 1967 defeat. It showed itself at different points both in the actual policies of 
separate states and as the matter of manipulation by the Arab regimes. Arab actors 
began to cultivate local patriotism (wattaniyya) among their peoples (Kober, 2002: 
41). State-directed patriotism fed on the diverse historical, geographic, economic,
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social, and political conditions of the respective states. Each state sought to 
consolidate its independence and sovereignty and to advance individual interests. 
Individual states displayed their readiness to cooperate with one another, but on the 
basis of the existing separate Arab identities (ibid: 42). At the same time, pivotal Arab 
actors turned to pan-Arab slogans in order to legitimize the cooperation of others 
under their leadership (ibid: 42).
So, since the creation of the State of Israel in 1948, the policy of the Arab states 
toward Israel has fluctuated between the two positions (ibid: 90).
On the initial stages of the conflict the Arab states found it difficult to come to grips 
with the broader question of the existence of the State of Israel and most of the Arab 
states perceived the creation of a Jewish state and the displacement of the Palestinian 
Arabs as two sides of the same coin (ibid: 9). However, as is shown by the 
dichotomy, the two sides started to be separated from each other based on materialist 
calculations.
The dichotomy in analyzing the Arab positions throughout the conflict is also present 
in the debate on which approach could be more suitable, that is constructivist or 
realist. Despite the fact that as has been mentioned the Arab states rather acted based 
on realist considerations, the constructivist discourse of viewing certain aspects can 
not be neglected completely, though the two are difficult to use at the same time. The 
constructivist analysis gives the opportunity to have the insight into the “micro­
processes at the level o f actor ‘agency’ whereby interactions and discourse shape 
normative change (Hinnebusch, 2001: 163).
When it comes to identity, it is championed by constructivism in opposition to the 
‘materialist’, ‘neo-utilitarian’ theories (Hinnebusch, 2001: 159). This is even more 
relevant in the light of supra-state identities (Arabism and Islam) over state conduct at 
the near-absence o f the national states assumed by realism (ibid: 160).
Within the Middle Eastern system, the individual states constitute the semi- 
permeable autonomous units (Kienle 1990: 9, 27). Due to the uniqueness o f this 
system with the mentioned above spill-over o f loyalties, the ideological influences 
readily crossed state lines, and each state had been highly sensitive to the actions of 
others and vulnerable to trans-state movements. In this context, according to 
Hinnebusch, aspirations for pan-Arab leadership were seen as realistic and rival 
leaders had an incentive to manipulate trans-state ideological appeals against each
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other in ways that would be either ineffective or viewed as a violation of sovereignty 
in a conventional states system.
The constructivist account in the context of the Arab politics deals with the changing 
balance between the pan-Arabism and sovereignty. And this swinging played a 
prominent part in defining the pan-Arab identity and the semi-institutionalization of 
its norms. According to these accounts, the rivalry was concentrated on the 
establishing of the normative order of the Arab system, and the bulk of this struggle 
was ideological appeal, where the legitimacy was derived from the norms of Arabism, 
which gave the power to affect outcomes (Hinnebusch, 2001:162). With pan-Arabism 
on the ascendancy as the dominant discourse, a process of ‘outbidding’ began in 
which rival state leaders sought to mobilize mass support by escalating its standards. 
This led to demands for more militancy toward imperialist footholds in the region, for 
greater integral unity between Arab states (e.g. United Arab Republic between Syria 
and Egypt) and later for greater militancy on behalf o f the Palestine cause (ibid: 162). 
Barnett (1998) in his “Dialogues in Arab Politics” adopted the constructivist approach 
which for him, allowed for the possibility that during a dialogue (that is “discussion 
among the members of the group about the norms that are to guide their relations”) 
Arab states were reconsidering their political identities as they reconsidered the 
norms that governed their relations. Barnett continued that Arabism and not anarchy 
provided leverage over the Arab government’s central objectives, presentation of self, 
and strategies; the technologies of power that they employed as they debated the 
norms that were to govern their relations. Arabism did not simply instruct them to 
avoid bilateral settlements with Israel; it also helped to construct Zionism as a threat 
and as a defining element of the Arab national interest. “To contemplate relations 
with Israel, to violate the taboo of Arab politics, was to invite public ridicule and 
charges of having betrayed the Arab nation” (Barnett, 1998).
With time the inter-Arab rivalries implied the Arab states to act in a risky 
commitments damaging to the interests of the particular states (Hinnebusch, 2001: 
163). The Arab states opted for the institutionalization of Arab Summits system, the 
outcome of which was the collective legitimization of a political settlement with 
Israel in return for its evacuation of the territories occupied in 1967. The growing 
acceptance of the view that pan-Arab norms had to be defined by an inter-elite 
consensus in which the interests of the individual states would inevitably be 
prioritized shifted the normative balance towards sovereignty (Hinnebusch, 1001:
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163). This was expressed in Egyptian-Israeli peace, Saddam Hussein’s invasion of 
Kuwait. According to Barnett (1998), the zero-sum interactions of Arab leaders lead 
to a norm dissensus that broke the moral power of pan-Arabism over their conduct.
But such approach is not enough to the understanding of the ‘macro-level structures’ 
taking into consideration the materialist context.
According to the realist accounts, first of all the pan-Arabism was an instrument of 
state power used by stronger states pursuing their ‘national interests’ against weaker 
ones. Besides, formally, the states were sovereign, and the state of sovereignty was 
acknowledged by state leaders and the supra-state community, lacking a common 
centralized authority or effective ‘inter-state’ regime, appeared highly anarchic 
(Hinnebusch, 2001: 161).
In the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict the situation was defined as the one of the 
state of belligerency with the State of Israel and therefore determined the interests. 
According to this approach the pan-Arab movement and the identity issue were used 
by the states not as the constructs but as the products of the situation in which the 
states had found themselves in. This also defined the states’ central objectives. On the 
micro-level of realist approach the concept of balance of power is stated, the 
maintenance of which in the case of the Arab -Israeli conflict can be said as the 
concerned states’ objective.
The formation of this kind of situation is described in the British Foreign Office 
report written before WWI: “history shows that the danger threatening the 
independence of this or that nation has generally arisen, at least in part, out of the 
momentary predominance of a neighboring State at once military powerful, 
economically efficient, and ambitious to extend its frontiers or influence...”, which is 
indicative o f the appearance of the State of Israel that immediately represented the 
threat and challenge to the neighboring Arab states, and the following military defeats 
made them take up the stance of further resisting it and maintaining the balance-of- 
power in order not to let further Israeli expansion. The balance-of-power, as 
continued in the report is described as “the equilibrium established by a grouping of 
forces, several countries forming leagues of defense” (quoted in Viotti and Kauppi, 
1998: 71). The latter point is exemplified by the attempts by different Arab states to 
form certain kinds of coalitions to stand against Israel, though it should be noted that 
the coalitions did not survive long due to the growing states’ transformation of 
interests based on the nation-state rather than common interests, and on the material
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calculations which did not often coincided with the collective enterprises. When 
Israel established its military supremacy in the region, the Arab states sought the co­
existence based in part on acceptance of this supremacy (Hinnebusch, 2001: 235). 
Throughout all stages of the evolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the co-existence 
remained the prominent issue.
Realism sees the states acting based on the premises of power relations and identifies 
the nation-states as the major players, who construct their policies based on security 
considerations (Viotti, Kauppi, 1998: 6-7). The security considerations constitute the 
formation of the states’ interests that stand as important policy bases. This stands true 
for the Arab states policies vis-á-vis Israel, as it represented the external threat and 
they had to apply all their will in order to counterpose it and maintain the balance of 
power not to allow Israel to take the dominance in the regional affairs. The states 
acted based on the formation of their interests which in the realist perspective had 
been formed out of calculations of military parity and the other side’s interests, 
relating to the game metaphor. “The game theory examines the strategic choices 
among self-interested rational actors who operate under a specified social situation in 
the context of interdependence of choice among other utility-maximizing actors” 
(Barnett, 1998). Moreover, the Arab states attempted to maximize their security or 
power, depending on the actions of other Arab states as well (ibid).
States sought alliances to enhance their capabilities through combination with others, 
which helped to deter potential aggressor and avoid an unwanted war, to prepare for a 
successful war if deterrence fails, or more generally to increase one’s influence in a 
high-threat environment or maintain balance-of power in the system (Barnett, 1998: 
8).
Here, the described earlier dichotomy is also present in the inter-Arab coalitions in 
their struggle with Israel which the states chose to participate in based on either 
ideological grounds or pragmatic considerations, with the latter appearing more 
applicable to the actual Arab states’ positions, which is described by Avi Kober in 
“Coalition Defection.”
The competition between the forces of pan-Arabism on the one hand and national 
interests of the Arab states on the other, and the eventual prevalence of the latter 
force, served as a fertile ground for the establishment of multiple but short-lived 
coalitions, headed by pivotal Arab states (Kober, 2002: 43). The tension between the 
allegiance to comprehensive Arab interests and commitment to individual state
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interests projected onto their position to Israel. On the one hand, pan-Arabism 
boosted Arab animosity toward Israel by making the conflict with Israel the concern 
of all Arabs and by forging a collective commitment to the struggle against Israel, 
which led to their participation in anti-Israeli coalitions (ibid: 43). On the other hand, 
the effectiveness of the coalitions was damaged by centrifugal forces in the Arab 
world (ibid: 43).
In this token, these states despite the community of language, culture, religion, and to 
some extent institutions and way of life did not manage to come together. This 
inability did not preclude the formation of regional groupings but not more than the 
short-lasting, unviable entities (Lewis, 2004: 225).
Since the conflict is a compound one and deals with the issues of territory, religion, 
identity, resources, and history, the nature of this dissertation is rather descriptive and 
deals with the historical narrative. This nature of approach is influenced by the fact 
that the academic filed on the topic lacks the theoretical framework within which the 
discussion can be undertaken, which makes the discussion difficult to integrate with 
the empirical fact. The majority of theoretical underpinning of this work thus deals 
with the elements of the realist theory of international relations and namely such its 
aspects as the “balance-of-power,” and the “game theory” (though others are not 
excluded), and the constructivism which is not dealt with in expanse in this work (see 





The June 1967 War resulted in the loss by the Arab states of the vast territories 
including the Golan Heights (formerly under control of Syria), West Bank (Jordanian 
territory), and Gaza Strip (under Egyptian control). This was the most dramatic and 
devastating failure for the Arab states, both of those who directly participated in the 
war and those who were at the sidelines. The conflict acquired the new dimension 
also with the conquest of Jerusalem by the Israelis, and the fact that Muslim and 
Christian holy places were now under Jewish control (Houráni, 2002: 413).
This was the crucial moment in the developments of the regional affairs which 
created the situation of uncertainty and confusion both for Israel and the Arab 
countries. The war marked the beginning of the new era when the regional actors 
needed to find the ways of how to react and reflect on the events and develop the 
future strategies of cooperation both between themselves and within the internal 
realms. It became clear that Israel was militarily stronger than any combination of 
Arab states, and this changed the relationship of each of them with the outside world 
(Houráni, 2002: 414).
The June 1967 war redefined the contours of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the possible 
means to its settlement. Both the Israeli and Arab parties entertained divergent ideas 
on the modalities of reaching a political settlement (Rabil; Rienner, 2003: 20). 
Obviously, the Arab regimes found themselves in a situation where they had to face 
and admit their weaknesses and inability to unite even in the light of the common 
cause that they had been propagating so vehemently and which enjoyed the trust of 
their own people. Now, besides the new stage in the relations with Israel, the Arab 
states came to the point when they also had to rethink the order of mutual relations 
and the basis on which they would now construct the policies.
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Of course, some states were affected by the consequences o f the war more than the 
others, but none of the regimes could remain still amidst the existing circumstances. 
Conservative and radical leaders were humiliated alike.
Among the states that suffered the greatest humiliation was Egypt. “Nasser’s regime 
had suffered a near-fatal blow in Sinai. No longer could he claim to be the savior of 
the Arab world; he had palpably dragged it into abyss. His and the Arab world’s 
bankruptcy was now clear for all to see” (Morris, 1999: 345). In Egypt the 
demonstrations followed that led to the resignation and even death of several senior 
generals, though Nasser himself remained in position.
He returned to power after the masses o f Egyptians persuaded him back, unwilling to 
have the Israelis claim another casualty of the war (Barnett, 1998). In the aftermath of 
the war Nasser reflected: “there is no doubt that what happened in 1967 has affected 
us all psychologically, morally, and materially” (quoted in Barnett, 1998).
In Syria the Ba’thist dictatorship had a tight grip, especially on the army and media, 
but the defeat led to some reverberations. In a two-stage coup in October 1969- 
November 1970, Defense Minister Hafez Asad-who was directly responsible for the 
defeat-became prime-minister. In 1971 he became president, with 99.2 per cent of the 
votes, in a plebiscite (Morris, 1999: 345). His regime emphasized the rebuilding of 
the armed forces for the “day of reckoning” (ibid: 345).
As Barnett points, one immediate consequence was a new period of malaise, self- 
criticism, and self-doubt. Within the Arab countries the contemplations on different 
sides were that what had happened was caused by the lack of radicalization of the 
societies and that too many compromises had been done along the way (Barnett, 
1998). In Egypt, a student movement appeared to challenge the government’s 
credentials. The Palestinians became radicalized, and various factions, like George 
Habash’s Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, came to the fore; many Arabs 
now saw the Palestinians as the potential vanguard of the revolution (ibid).
Even though pan-Arabism still played an important role within the states and on the 
inter-states level, and it was the basis o f negotiating of the policy-making, it appeared 
on the road to decline. Significant point here is that now pan-Arabism started to be 
used more as a whipping boy unlike in the previous years when it experienced the 
role of an honored and priority cause of most of the deeds of the Arab states and 
people. Barnett (1998) gives an account of this feature saying that on the road to the 
war, the Arab leaders taunted and challenged each other in the name of Arab
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nationalism. Nasser took the risks that could lead to an unwanted war in the name of 
Arabism, and King Hussein, by fearing that he would be remained on the sidelines 
and loose more if not declaring war on Israel, also made his decisions in the name of 
Arabism. “Arabism spurred Arab leaders to engage in escalating actions that they 
believed were military foolish but politically expedient, outbid one another to the 
point of an unwanted war, and divert resources from the Arab-Israeli conflict and 
toward inter-Arab feuds” (Barnett, 1998).
By the mid-1960s pan-Arabism had lost its luster. All the unification talks between 
the Arab regimes had failed and the already existing entities like United Arab 
Republic ceased its existence.
This was the period when the states started to turn to the direction of conservative, 
and more pragmatic orientation, and even though they still built their relation toward 
Israel on ideological considerations, in between the states the shift took place “from 
ideology to oil, from symbolic capital to economic capital, from the Mashreq and the 
heart of Arab nationalism to the Arabian Gulf and the periphery of Arab politics” 
(Barnett, 1998).
The factor that came to play a prominent role in the states’ policy-making and the 
considerations for taking the positions was the one of the shifting balance from the 
all-Arab orientation toward the nation-state approach. The shift to sovereignty was 
the initial condition for the states’ taking the more realist approach in the context of 
the Arab-Israeli conflict, which came its dominant, prioritized position in the 1970s 
and 1980s, and remained at the core after the peace process, started in the beginning 
of the 1990s.
It cannot be said that the nationalism ceased to exist or started to take the side-line 
positions in the life of the Arab states, but rather it shifted to the territorial level, when 
the citizens growingly started to identify with their states. The aftermath events of the 
1967 war invested in that trend “encouraged the citizens, however reluctantly and 
halfheartedly, to transfer their loyalties to the territorial state” (Barnett, 1998). This 
was accompanied by the reinforcement of the on-going state-building process 
intended to increase the loyalties of societies to the state and by association to the 
regime in power (ibid). Like this, the constructivist account of the consequences of 
the 1967 war with the decline o f Arabism and its power to mobilize public opinion 
directed to the internal situations and the quest for the leadership within the Arab 
world by many Arab leaders and unification attempts, becomes less useful in
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explaining the Arab states’ positions and behavior in relation to the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. The realist account of the events presents more appropriate explanations to 
their developments, with the coming into the fore of the balance-of-power notion, 
where the states sought to make the “scales” go down in their direction.
The consolidation of the nation states therefore was one of the factors that 
characterized the Arab-Israeli confrontation in the period after the 1967 war (Kober, 
2002: 88).
Another important factor of the period was the need to address the domestic 
socioeconomic problems and the apprehension among Arab states about radical 
Islamic forces that were perceived as a threat to secular or pragmatic Muslim regimes 
(Kober, 2002: 88).
However, the theme of pan-Arabism, though with the declined attractiveness to it, 
had not been abandoned post-1967 period completely, which still remained a potent 
force in constructing policies in the sphere o f the Arab-Israeli conflict. This was the 
basis of the Arab states’ rhetoric o f how to deal with the State of Israel and construct 
their relations with it: either based on diplomacy or military means, and either to 
approach it collectively or unilaterally. The states needed to work out either 
comprehensive or incremental approaches, choose between cooperation and 
confrontation.
It was during this time that Abdel Nasser talked about the need to distinguish between 
the concepts of “unity o f ranks” and “unity of purpose.” The former referred to the 
common practice among Arab states of pursuing their own interests while trying to 
cooperate with the other members of the league. The latter was based on the idea that 
all the Arabs should work as a team to achieve such common objectives as the return 
of the occupied territories and the establishment of a Palestinian states. Though a 
number of Arab regimes claimed to adhere to the principle of unity of purpose, 
virtually all of them actually started to operate in terms of unity of ranks, indicating 
the realist approach. The debate was often raised in the inter-Arab talks and the 
practice often showed the prevalence of the latter trend.
As the future relative to that period showed, the states “chose” to take rather hard-line 
positions in dealing with Israel. They took up the path which led them to another war 
in 1973, the result of the irredentist and deterministic stances.
It is understandable that the period was characterized by the “frozen diplomacy”, as 
described by Lesch and Tschigri (1998). But as Eba Eban, one of the time Israeli
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cabinet ministers, said: “even the diplomatic activity that is not leading anywhere is 
better than no diplomatic activity at all” (quoted in Shlaim, 2004: 261). This gave the 
time for the Arab states to comprehend the situation and think of the ways, especially 
for the moderate states, to avoid the military action. Indeed, time was still raw for the 
states to grasp the situation and make rational judgments. To many Arab observers, 
the inclination was to believe that Israel deliberately provoked the Six Day War in 
order to fulfill its long-standing territorial ambitions. Therefore, from the very start it 
was clear that the states would choose to deny any settlement with Israel and will do 
the utmost in order to regain the lost territories and try the attempts to recover the 
shattered both self-respect and the respect in the eyes o f the broader international 
community. That the small, young state, inferior in manpower managed to outbid the 
vast Arab armies could not be accepted kindheartedly by the Arab states and implied 
for the revenge, if not military then political one.
At first, immediately after the war’s end, the Arab states remained silent. They were 
too shellshocked, as Barnett (998) describes it, to offer much of an explanation for 
recent events and chart a course for redemption. Though, the realization was that 
something needed to be done. They realized that Israel, a product of mixed socio­
economic, ethnic, and national heritages, had managed to organize itself into a 
powerful military machine, and thus the need was for a unified Arab stand, but it was 
not immediately that the states managed to call for a summit in order to make 
proclamations concerning their future (Barnett, 1998). Yet again, the problem was in 
their unresolved differences between themselves. They needed to reflect on the causes 
of their failure and the basis on which they would build their mutual relations. 
Undeniably, this basis should have been the consolidation of the unity among the 
states, the lack of which was the main reason for the defeat in the 1967 war, as was 
proposed by Iraq and Syria in the summer of 1967. Here, the indicative feature is that 
the debates over the issues were also based on the divergence of positions among the 
radical states (including Syria, Iraq) and the moderates (Egypt, Jordan). The former 
called for greater radicalization and unification along this line in order to reverse the 
results of June (Barnett, 1998). The latter showed signs for reversing the past 
positions onto the more modest ones, and taking Israel-centered interpretation of the 
unity in order to come to the solution. The moderation in the Arab perception of the 
conflict with Israel also expressed itself in their gradual conceptualization of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict as a dispute over borders and their focus on the military,
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economic, and diplomatic means for restoring these territories to Arab sovereignty 
(Kober, 2002: 89).
The change toward the more moderate stances was conditioned first of all by the 
devastation felt by the countries after the war, the realization by the leaders of their 
weakened credentials for realizing past dreams for the “Arab” revolution, and the 
necessity to concentrate scarce resources towards recovering the territories and not 
towards harassing the conservative Arab states.
Benny Morris (1999), among the reasons of the Arab failure, points to the lack of 
motivation of the Arab armies and the lack of understanding for what they had to 
fight. They fought for the territories they had never been to before, and had no 
personal relation to them whatsoever. And despite the force of the pan-Arab rhetoric, 
it did not manage to unite the people of the countries, which was realized by some of 
the Arab leaders, and invested in the comprehension of the importance of the turning 
to the nation-states and addressing the country-based problems.
For some states, the unity was better based on the coordination of the efforts in 
confronting Israel rather than integrating their abilities. “Jordan and Saudi Arabia 
insisted that a successful confrontation of Israel was premised on inter-Arab 
‘cooperation,’ that is, recognizing the legitimacy of each other’s states” (Barnett, 
1998). King Hussein stated that the Arab states needed not integration but 
‘coordination’ in order to revert the current mess (ibid). The theme that sounded in 
the Arab official statements o f the moderate leaders and the state media was 
concerned with the coexistence of different systems that were present in the region, 
and the respect of each state for adoption of any. During the immediate days of post- 
June war, the states showed their determination of non-settlement with Israel without 
the return of the lost territories, the precondition for any talks with Israel. They 
rejected the decision of the Israeli cabinet of ministers of 19 June, where Israel 
“proposed the conclusion of a peace agreement on the basis of the international 
border and withdrawal from heavily populated West Bank” (Shlaim, 2001: 253) (see 
Appendix 1). The Arab states sent their reply to that through Washington stating that 
they completely rejected the Israeli proposal. Their case was that Israel’s withdrawal 
must be unconditional, the evidence that from the beginning their positions would be 
deterministic (ibid: 254).
When the West Bank and Gaza were controlled by Jordan and Egypt, respectively, 
the Arabs refused to negotiate directly with Israel. After Israel occupied these
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territories in 1967, the initial Arab response was to reject the idea of peace and direct 
negotiations with Israel. Later those Arab governments that accepted the UN 
Resolution 242 (see Appendix 2) took the position that negotiations within an 
international forum could begin only if full Israeli withdrawal to the June 4, 1967 
lines was assured at the outset. (Report of a Study Group, 1988: 18, 19). The 
Resolution 242 was ambiguous in its contents referring to “territories occupied in the 
conflict” form which Israel was required to withdraw, like this giving the room for 
the states concerned interpret it as they saw fit, as the resolution did not specify the 
territories for withdrawal. So, Egypt interpreted the resolution as calling for Israel to 
withdrawal from “the occupied territories,” prior to any political settlement. The 
parties concerned found the room to change their attitudes in response to shifting 
political and military conditions while still agreeing on the resolution as a basis to 
enter into negotiations (Rabil; Reinner, 2003: 20).
Among the radical states, Syria rejected the UNRSC 242 (though accepted it later). 
The reason for rejection was explained by the radical position of this state and the 
fear that bilateral negotiations and settlement with Israel would isolate it from the 
international affairs.
It claimed that “were the resolutions accepted and implemented, the Syrian regime 
has said it would enter into a non-belligerency agreement with Israel, but has ruled 
out the more expansive idea of normalization of relations and full peace treaties. Syria 
wanted to be involved in any efforts to resolve the Palestinian issue and was not 
readily agree to limit its role to bilateral negotiations with Israel over the Golan” 
(ibid: 22). This rhetoric pointed to the still present within the state of the ambitions to 
rule the region, to realize the idea of “Greater Syria,” the element playing one of the 
crucial roles in stance-taking.
By the time the Resolution 242 was adopted, Syria not only rejected it but had also 
reaffirmed its commitment to the “people’s liberation war” (Rabil; Rienner, 2003: 
20). The latter “slogan” allowed Palestinian guerillas to be in the vanguard of the 
fight.
Syria was also the only country that boycotted the decisions o f the Khartoum summit 
of 1967, and it became suspicious of the resultant merger of the Egyptian-Jordanian 
axis (Miller, 1986: 48). Here it is the reflection of the tendency of the Arab states 
relation to the summitry. As Avraham Sela explains, “the dichotomy between the two 
groups [radicals and moderates] is shown by the consistent high-ranking
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representation and attendance of the Gulf monarchies, Jordan, and Morocco at Arab 
summits, as opposed to the frequency with which radical regimes such as Syria, 
Libya, Algeria, and Iraq have boycotted the Arab summit” (Sela, 1998: 22). 
Throughout the conflict Syria has always pursued the goal to achieve “strategic 
parity” with Israel in order to have an independent military option in the event of 
another war with Israel and as a necessary precondition for any negotiations, the 
mentioning of which came at later stages of the conflict, and can be considered as a 
much unrealistic option in the years following the 1967 Six Day War till the October 
War of 1973 (ibid: 22).
The position which this country took was in big part defined by the Ba’thi regime that 
came to power in the aftermath of the June war, and it was against this background 
that the developments in its positions took place in the course of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict (Rabil; Rienner, 2003: 21). The more radical fraction of the regime denied 
any role to the Arab states in the military struggle on account of their allegedly 
reactionary regimes. Another school, led by Defense Minister Asad (who later 
became president), advocated a nationalist policy that gave priority to strengthening 
the Syrian defense establishment along the cooperation with other Arab countries, in 
the interest of the military struggle with Israel. Asad’s attitude to Palestinian guerillas 
was also different whereby he placed them under stricter control, for their actions 
were seen as provision for Israel with the pretext to strike against Syrian positions 
(ibid: 21). As a president, Asad broke Syria from the position of regional isolation, 
and decided to join the proposed Federation of Arab Republics, comprising Egypt, 
Libya, and Sudan (which did not work). When Asad assumed power, in relations with 
Israel, he reaffirmed Syria’s rejection of Resolution 242 and began in earnest 
preparing for battle with Israel. The new leader also started to look for the new allies, 
the most credible of whom he saw in Egypt, led by Sadat after Nasser’s, the Egyptian 
charismatic leader’s, death.
Despite the Arab determination to resist Israel by all means possible, there were the 
leaders that represented the stances ready to conclude a kind of peace settlement with 
Israel realizing the importance of pragmatism, but the attachment to the “all-Arab” 
positions did not allow those to act constructively in that direction. By doing so, they 
risked to arouse the condemnation of the radical states and loose the domestic support 
for their regimes, and also cause the disturbance in the domestic environment. 
Besides, among the features preventing their open rapprochement with Israel was the
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material dependence on the other Arab states. For instance in August of 1967, at the 
Arab summit in Sudanese Khartoum, the states established the fund to assist the 
economics o f Egypt and Jordan, the aid that these countries required to remain 
economically viable. The frontline states agreed that the compensation should be 
made for the losses of 1967 war, but Syria was excluded from the compensation 
package because it refused to attend the summit, again showing the radical position 
like in the case with the accepting the UNSCR 242. The states also established the 
Joint Arab Defense Council, the inter-Arab coordinating body, to mobilize and 
coordinate the Arab military effort. However, the emphasis was that military 
development and planning would be let up to individual countries. This decision 
influenced the way the states transferred, coordinated and negotiated most resources, 
which was carried out mostly on the bi-lateral level rather than multilateral basis 
(Barnett, 1998).
The Khartoum Summit and its resolutions represent the important turning point in 
deliberations of the Arab states. In Khartoum resolutions they formulated the policies 
concerning the conflict with Israel, the order that prevailed up until the early 1970s. 
This was the first critical meeting of the Arab states, in a way culminating by itself 
the debates of the Arab states about the mutual relations and the Arab unity and their 
positions in the Arab-Israeli conflict.
One of the distinctive features of the summit was that, in the words of Charles Smith 
(in Fawcett, 2005: 225), “the contradictions found in Khartoum reflected those in 
Arab alliance on the eve of the 1967 war. Nasser favored a diplomatic resolution of 
the crisis and sided with Jordan’s King Hussein in seeking intervention via the United 
Nations. Syrian refusal to consider negotiations was consistent with Syrian hostility 
toward Israel prior to the war as was Palestinian rejection of talks.” Even though the 
states agreed that “the groundwork for the summit would be the unity in the ranks and 
unified action in the shared struggle against Israel regardless of the differences 
between Arab states” (words of a Sudanese prime minister Muhammad Ahmad 
Majhub, quoted in Barnett, 1998), it was clear that the strategies suggested by 
different states reflected the states’ perceptions of their own interests (Fawcett, 2005: 
226).
The debates on the Arab unity, the inter-Arab relations, non-interference in each 
other’s affairs highlighted the atmosphere in which the states came to formulating the 
common position on the matter of Israel. But the fact that they never came to the
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stable order of inter-relations reflects the ways in which the Arab states acted in the 
further years of conflict development and, in a way, explaining the successes, and 
impasses in establishing the non-belligerent relations with Israel.
3.2. “Khartoum Order”
The order that defined itself after the 1967 war was the one of “no war no peace” 
stalemate. The regimes did not consider any military option directed toward Israel 
publicly, but as the events o f the beginning of 1970s showed later, the states took the 
efforts to abrogate the existing order. As Barnett writes, “one hopeful scenario was 
that it would conclude in much as had the Suez War of 1957: a return to the status 
quo ante”, however the circumstances defined themselves to be different and short of 
providing the recurrence of the precedent.
For the large part the order had been defined by the Khartoum summit and the 
following resolutions (see Appendix 3). Eight heads of states (excluding Syria, which 
refused to attend the summit and called it the “latest podium for the advocates of the 
liquidation of the Palestinian cause” (quoted in Miller, 1986: 48) came up with the 
“Three No’s”. The resolutions of the Arab leaders provided little hope for the 
settlement of the conflict, and left the room for the parties concerned in the conflict to 
act according to how they had understood those statements. The Article 3 of the 
resolutions said that “the Arab Heads of State have agreed to unite their political 
efforts at the international and diplomatic level to eliminate the effects of the 
aggression and to ensure the withdrawal o f the aggressive Israeli forces form the Arab 
lands which have been occupied since the aggression of June 5. This will be done 
within the framework of the main principles by which the Arab states abide, namely, 
no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with it, and insistence 
on the rights of the Palestinian people in their own country” (Jewish virtual library). 
The Article stated by itself the deterministic position, though gave some hope for 
political rather than military handling of the situation. But the way the Arab states 
expressed their positions warned the Israeli protagonists and invested in the rigidity of 
reaching the solution. According to Benny Morris (1999), Arab states’ “Three No’s” 
invested in Israel’s counterposition which was ‘direct negotiations’ with the Arab 
states and ‘defensible borders’, a euphemism for non-withdrawal to the 1967 lines 
(Morris, 1999: 346). Arab rejectionism, thus, is seen as responsible for the gradual 
emergence of Israeli rejectionism and expansionism; the Arab stance prompted the
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partial Israeli retreat from the cabinet decision of June 19, which had implicitly 
affirmed the principle o f territory for peace, and its replacement by the concept of 
‘defensible borders’ and the practice of creeping annexation (ibid: 346).
On the face, the declarations showed no sign of readiness of compromise, and this is 
how Israel interpreted them. Here the game metaphor comes into play, when the sides 
to the conflict calculate their actions on the basis of their perceptions of the interests 
of opponents and the attempts to come to the zero-sum result. At this stage of the 
conflict, the two sides had not yet been ready to accept each other in a way to live 
side by side in security situation. Rather, each wanted to gain as much as possible and 
be the only power in the region. In a non-zero-sum games, the “players have to 
understand each other, to discover patterns of individual behavior that make each 
player’s actions predictable to the other; they have to test each other for a shared 
sense of pattern or regularity and to exploit clichés, conventions, and impromptu 
codes for signaling their intensions and responding to each other’s signals. They must 
communicate by hint or by suggestive behavior” (Schelling, 1997: 85). In the case of 
the Arab states they gave a somewhat ambiguous hint for Israel on how they had been 
planning to approach further relations with the “expansionist” neighbor. Arab 
spokesmen interpreted the Khartoum declarations to mean no form al peace treaty, but 
not a refusal to talk through third parties; and not de jure recognition of Israel, but 
acceptance of its existence as a state (Shlaim, 2004: 258).
The document lacked the flexibility, and though it was the common Arab consensus, 
some states did not agree to its form, but could do little to have it modified according 
to the individual preferences at the time due to the fear of being charged with 
“defeatism”. On the other hand, the document was considered to be the victory for the 
moderate states, which had been prepared to go further in the settlement with Israel, 
for it had the credentials of a prospect of a diplomatic and piecemeal settlement. 
Among those states had been Egypt and Jordan, to whom Israel turned its attention, 
after Syria unambiguously denied any talks determined to reverse the order that came 
about after the war. The latter state saw it as sacrificing Arab nationalism for a new 
conservatism. When Jordan and Egypt had taken steps toward a peace settlement with 
Israel, by accepting UNSCR 242 and the propositions of the United Nations special 
representative Gunnar Jarring, this arouse the anger of those elements of the Arab 
world, which maintained a total confřontationist position- Syria and Iraq (Freedman, 
1979: 95).
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In the private spheres the states preferred a more flexible document. The Arab states 
had private doubts about the “three no’s”, but once they had publicly pledged 
themselves to these principles they could not deviate from them without subjecting 
themselves to ridicule (Barnett, 1998). Even those Arab leaders who might have 
privately contemplated a political compromise did not hint publicly for such 
sentiments for fear o f being placed outside the consensus (ibid). Even though both 
sides, Israel and the Arab states realized the necessity of peace, “the taboo made 
direct contacts perilous for any Arab leader” (ibid).
At Khartoum, Nasser of Egypt and Hussein of Jordan reached a genuine 
understanding and formed a united front against the hard-liners (Shlaim, 2004: 258). 
This joint position appears a strange outcome in the light of the fact that Egypt and 
Jordan have always had suspicions on each others’ accounts. The suspicion was 
caused by King Hussein’s traditional “cordial” relations with the Israeli leaders, and 
later, under Sadat in Egypt the two states would break the diplomatic relations on the 
ground of Jordan’s proposed Federal Plan to incorporate in the federation the East 
Bank, West Bank and Gaza Strip. The two leaders, the Jordanian and Egyptian, 
suspected each other of their possible separate deals over the West Bank and Sinai 
respectively. But at that time the “alliance” was seen as practicable move to further 
the states’ aims. This movement was conditioned by the fact that Egypt found that 
there was little military action from the Syrian side during the 1967 war, and that 
Syrian position could once again drag Egypt into an unwanted armed confrontation 
with Israel (though it was Nasser who launched the War of Attrition directed to Israel 
in 1968, and was Syria’s partner in attacking Israel in 1973). Besides, Nasser 
compensated for the loss of Syrian ally by drawing closer to his erstwhile enemies, 
Hussein of Jordan and Faisal of Saudi Arabia (Freedman, 1979: 96). The latter and 
Egypt had been engaged in the conflict in the North Yemen (the Yemen Arab 
Republic). Faisal, in return for an Egyptian pledge to pull its troops out of North 
Yemen, thus ending a serious threat to Saudi Arabian Security, promised to pay a 
subsidy of several hundred million dollars per year to Egypt to help compensate it for 
its wartime losses, including the loss of revenue caused by the closure of the Suez 
Canal (ibid: 96).
King Hussein expressed the regret on the things that had been said at the conference, 
however admitted that this document “charged the states directly involved with 
working toward a political settlement” (ibid: 263). King Hussein, reflecting on the
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Summit, said, behind the scenes: “At Khartoum I fought very much against the three 
no’s. But the atmosphere developed there into one where all the people who used to 
support Nasser turned on him and turned on him in such a vicious way that I found 
myself unable to continue to take any stand but to come closer to him and defend him 
and accuse them of responsibility in things that happened. That was the first collision 
I had with many of my friends in the Arab world” (quoted in Shlaim, 2004: 259). This 
approach indicates the disunity among the Arab ranks and at the same time 
dependence of the states on each other, and also the inability to admit by the Arab 
states that there were abnormal condition of the internal situations of the Arab states 
and conditions under which they built their “solidarity.” The states still paid their 
“lip-service” to the Arab unity, and showed inability of a state to diverge from the 
common position and imposing its own will to reach the stated aims.
King Hussein offered that the Arab world was being asked to choose between the 
two roads. The first was “to continue the negative policies which harm us most of 
all. . . a continuation of the old superficial policy characterized by extemporization 
whose harmful consequences were exposed and experienced by the people. The 
second road began with shouldering the responsibilities, which made it incumbent 
upon Arab states to abandon outbidding” (quoted in Barnett, 1998). The unity the 
King spoke about in reality expressed itself on the rather nominal than practical level 
in the course of the conflict, whereas the states acted on the grounds of pragmatic 
considerations. The regimes had different ideological affiliations, the factor that 
obstructed the efforts to create a unified anti-Israeli front (Kober, 2002: 46).
The Khartoum Summit also marked the “new pragmatism” of the Arab leaders, 
especially seen in the position taken by Abdel Nasser. He withdrew from the cause of 
radicalism and dedicated himself to the task of retrieving Egyptian land and Arab 
dignity, and the conservative states supported the stance. However, at Khartoum he 
did not speak only about the Egyptian lands, and gave the priority to the resolving of 
the Palestinian issue and the issue of the West Bank and Gaza (Shalim, 2004: 259). 
Nasser adopted a more conservative orientation and supported the view that 
cooperation among all the Arab states was necessary for preparing for the next phase 
of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In a way such an orientation was connected with 
conception of Egypt’s and the Arab national interests at the time. The 1967 war was a 
profoundly demoralizing and dispiriting debacle, and Nasser was ready to do all he 
could to recoup his prestige (Barnett, 1998).
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Therefore, the order that established itself in the immediate months of the June 1967 
war was the ground for the political stalemate in the region. Whereas Israel did its 
utmost in order to preserve this stalemate, because the longer it existed, the stronger 
its position in the occupied territories would become. The Arab states in their turn 
were ready to do all they could to reverse the existing situation to avoid the inhibition 
of the reaching their cause and realization of ambitions, and uprooting the spirit of 
“defeatism.”
On the one hand, the way the Arab states acted showed their willingness to reach a 
solution to the conflict and avoid the military clashes with Israel, excluding the 
radical states; but on the other it was also the direct route to another full-scale war. 
The inability of the Israeli and Arab negotiators to find common grounds that would 
be accepted by both sides made the further developments in the positive directions 
impossible. Both sides understood from the outset of making the proposals that these 
would be denied by the opponents but none could behave in a way that would label 
them “concessionists,” and leave the negative mark in the internal ranks, and on the 
side of the Arab states within the inter-Arab realm. Subsequently, the events that took 
place in the years after 1969 invested in the launching of the war with Israel by Egypt 
and Syria in October 1973.
3.3. The Road to War
The key developments that took place in the years before the 1973 October war can 
be related to the War of Attrition initiated by Nasser in 1969 continuing till 1970, and 
the tensions between the Palestinians and their Arab hosts.
The War of Attrition was a reaction of the Egyptian leader on the lack of progress in 
the Arab-Israeli relations. This was marked by the initiation of tensions and escalation 
of fighting along the Suez Canal. Like this, Nasser tried to bring about some 
diplomatic action on the part of the United States and the Soviet Union, and also to 
urge Israel to take more active steps in the direction of Arab-Israeli accommodation, 
and extract from this state the conditions that could be suitable for the Arab states 
going in accord with the latter’s major demands for territorial redemption.
Nasser’s immediate goal was to prevent the conversion of the Suez Canal into a de 
facto border, as suggested by the cease-fire agreements decreed by the UN after the 
end of the June War, and to force Israel to withdraw to the pre-war border, as his 
ultimate object (Shlaim, 2004: 289). The war was launched for various strategic,
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political, and symbolic reasons. With this war Nasser had as one of the aims to attract 
the Arab unity and mobilize the Arab armies and resources for this fight, however, he 
received little support from his neighbors. The conference in Rabat, Morocco, in 
December 1969 clearly showed it. Even though the summit itself did not result in any 
crucial decisions or resolutions, the way the states approached it once again signified 
their internal divisions. Significant point here is that Saudi Arabia showed continuous 
dissatisfaction with the Khartoum resolutions and found hard time in reconciling with 
its commitments towards the summit’s resolutions. Besides, it had long-standing ties 
to the United States and was interested in reducing the Soviet Unions ties to the 
region and was eager to accept the proposals for peace suggested by the United States 
and rejected by Israel. This kind of stance raised dissatisfaction among the front-line 
states and they threatened to stay away from the summit until all Arab states 
reaffirmed that the battlefield rather than the bargaining table was the means to 
retrieve the Arab lands and dignities (Barnett, 1998). Nasser used Rabat summit “to 
excoriate the Saudis implicitly but clearly for their association with the United States” 
(ibid). During the last session in the summit, Syria and Iraq boycotted it due to their 
view of the conference’s resolutions lack of confrontation towards Israel (Freedman, 
1979: 96). The Arab confřontationists who had done nothing to aid Egypt in its war of 
attrition, denounced the cease-fire agreement, suggested by United States Secretary of 
State Rogers in June 1970 (see Appendix 4), as did the Palestinians who feared that 
Egypt and Jordan (who accepted the plan) were planning to sell them out in return for 
an agreement with Israel which would restore their lost territories (ibid: 97). But this 
move by Nasser is considered to be tactical rather than permanent one in order to earn 
for him the breathing space. According to the cease-fire agreement, the two sides, 
Egypt and Israel, were to respect the “standstill” during the cease-fire: neither Egypt 
nor Israel were allowed to move their missiles closer to the canal. However, on the 
day the cease-fire came into force, on the 7 August 1970, Egypt, with the Soviet help, 
violated the “standstill” agreement and moved its missiles to the edge of the Suez 
Canal (Shlaim, 2004: 297), which is viewed as a provision by Egypt of a cover for the 
forthcoming 1973 war for itself.
The War of Attrition did not bring with it the expected results of the rapprochement 
with Israel, gaining of the lost territories, or Arab unity in the fight for the common 
aim, but huge losses on both sides. Neither did it remove the political stalemate- the 
wishful outcome for the Arab side. However, the war is seen by some analysts as a
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victory for Egypt, for it concluded in the psychological and international balance to 
Egypt’s advantage. It was also seen as an opportunity for Egypt of a free hand over 
the next three years to prepare for the great war of October 1973 (Shlaim, 2004: 297). 
Nasser himself considered the war to be the victory, because he had enlisted the 
Soviet militarily and the United States diplomatically in the effort to negotiate a 
solution (Lesch, Tschigri, 1998: 24). From the side of the Soviets there was vast 
physical presence in the country and fifteen thousand soldiers and several hundred 
military experts; from the United States the Rogers Initiative. Other Arab officials 
received the acceptance of the initiative as evidence of potential capitulation and 
negotiations with Israel. Syria and Iraq painted the initiative as defeatist. The more 
radical elements of the PLO accused Nasser of treason and of flirting with the 
political solution (Barnett, 1998). This kind of attitudes of the Arab states prevented 
Nasser from making further steps towards the peace process with Israel. In addition 
this was another example of the lack of the Arab states’ readiness and the ability at 
this point to consider the possibility of any settlement with the State of Israel, and 
putting down their ambitious plans of retrieving the lost lands and accepting Israel as 
an equal, politically relevant player of the region, and the business partner.
Another factor that played an important role in Arab relations with Israel was the 
Arab states relations with the Palestinians, especially their representation by the 
Palestine Liberation Organization established in 1964 by the Arab efforts. In the 
period of time, the relations reached the tensions which manifested themselves in 
Jordan, the state where Palestinian guerillas had their established bases. The latter led 
their fight for the pursuit of their goal of replacing Israel with a Palestinian state. 
These tensions invested to the changing post-1967 order, and manifested the 
relationship between the Palestinian nationalism and the Jordanian sovereignty. 
Jordanian- Palestinian relations have been characterized by the mutual suspicion. The 
latter was created by Abdullah’s (King Hussein’s grand father, and former King of 
Jordan) annexation of the West Bank and near peace with Israel after the 
establishment of the latter. Besides, both Abdullah and Hussein had been viewed as 
cooperators with the enemies of the Arab nations- the British, the Zionists, and the 
Americans (Miller, 1986: 32). Hussein, following the traditions set by his 
grandfather, maintained both a pro-western orientation and a pragmatic view of 
Israel. This fact often complicated the relations of Jordan with its neighbors, and 
conditioned the often hesitant position in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
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Besides, its economic weakness and fragile internal political situation prevented it 
from taking the decisions that would have been best suitable to its national interests. 
Salloukh in his article “State Strength, Permeability, and Foreign Policy Behavior: 
Jordan in Theoretical Perspective” writes that “permeability o f the Arab states 
system, best exemplified in the spill-over effect of trans-national appeals such as pan- 
Islamic and pan-Arab ideologies across the state borders, rendered Jordan’s domestic 
arena vulnerable to external (and internal) manipulation, especially by aspiring 
regional powers.” So, as the author continues, “it required of the regime to pursue an 
‘honorable, just solution’ to the Palestinian problem, sensitive to Palestinian public 
opinion.” And the lack of the natural borders and geographic location between 
contending regional aspirants (Iraq, Syria, and Israel), had often exposed Jordan to 
the pressures of regional powers, constraining the country’s foreign policy options 
(ibid: Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol. 18, 1996). Jordan represented by itself the state 
that was willing to venture toward an alignment with Israel, but due to inter-Arab 
constraints it could not afford an official alignment with it (Kober, 2002: 79).
In the wake of the Jordanian crisis in 1970, King Hussein had to balance his 
sympathy for the Palestinians (who constituted half of the country’s population) with 
the need to maintain his own power and prevent another war with Israel (Lesch; 
Tschigri: 1998: 23). This underscored the growing division among Arabs over 
whether they should take an ideological or pragmatic approach to their conflict with 
Israel (ibid: 23).
In 1970s various clashes between Palestinian guerillas and Jordanian military started, 
and as a reaction King Hussein ordered his army to disarm and break the power of 
Palestinian organizations. Fatah, a moderate wing of the PLO sought an agreement 
with the Jordanian government, unlike other factions such as Palestinian Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine, which took a more confrontational line and began openly declaring their 
opposition to the king and declaring that Jordan was Palestine (Barnett, 1998). The 
negotiations that followed did not bring any substantial results and in September 
1970, the PFLP hijacked a number of planes, flew them to Amman, and blew them 
up. This act posed the challenge both to the king and Arafat, the PLO’s leader, and 
the defender of the Palestinian cause. Moreover, the crisis led to the disagreements 
within the Arab ranks. At the height of the crisis, Syria, the vehement defender of the 
Palestinian cause, intervened in the fight by helping the Palestinians. Syria decided to
41
support the fedayeen’s challenge to King Hussein. Asad, then the chief of the air 
force, did not oppose the intervention of Syrian-backed Palestinian Liberation Army 
tanks into Jordan, but he was wary of triggering an Israeli or a U.S. reaction and thus 
opposed the use of Syrian air support (Miller, 1986: 48) He made the realist 
calculations, for after the Syrian intervention King Hussein sent an urgent appeal for 
help to Washington. The latter promised the help, however it was not used because 
the Jordan’s army itself went into action against Syrian invaders (Shlaim, 2004: 299). 
At the end of the crisis, the Palestinians were defeated, Syria retreated, and King 
Hussein remained in power. As a result, Jordan earned itself the improved relations 
with Israel, and the Jordanian-Israeli alliance solidified after the events of the Black 
September, as the crisis is referred to. This became possible due to the combination of 
the resolute pro-Hashemite (or pro-government) forces in Jordan and American- 
Israeli cooperation which included the deployment of Israeli forces along its borders 
with Jordan and Syria, which deterred the Syrians from conducting military 
operations and from an all-out invasion of Jordan (Kober, 2002: 94). As a result of 
the crisis, Hussein came to realize the full significance of the relations with Israel. 
Since then, the Jordanian-Israeli alliance was motivated to a great extent by 
“omnibalancing considerations on the part of Jordan” (ibid: 94).
In Syrian case, Asad’s reaction to the Jordanian crisis reflected the new pragmatism 
that appeared in the Syrian foreign policy (Miller, 1986: 49). The new flexibility was 
based on Asad’s belief that Syria could not pursue its goals from an isolated position 
within the Arab world or by allowing the fedayeen the kind of independence that 
could destabilize Arab regimes (ibid: 49). Miller (1986) sees the roots of Asad’s 
pragmatism in his understanding both of the limitations under which he was operating 
as a result of Israel’s military superiority and the strengths Syria possessed in relation 
to the weaknesses of its Arab neighbors.
The consequences of the Palestinian- Jordanian clashes of August-September, 1970 
also include the altered Arab state involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The 
Palestinian defeat, and subsequent losses in later engagements with Jordanian forces, 
forced the PLO to move its command structure in 1971 from Jordan to Lebanon. 
From that time onward, PLO actions against Israel engaged Lebanon more directly 
into Arab-Israeli conflict and became a major factor in instigating a Lebanese civil 
war in the mid-1970s. The Jordanian civil war had another casualty: Nasser of Egypt 
died shortly after negotiating a ceasefire. He was succeeded by Anwar Sadat, who,
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from 1971-1973, sought unsuccessfully to negotiate with Israel for a settlement 
involving Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai, and failed to gain American backing for 
his efforts (Morris, 1999: 227). He suggested the partial peace in return for Israeli 
partial withdrawal from Sinai, which would have allowed the Suez Canal to reopen, 
the initiative which was rejected by Israel (Lesch; Tschigri, 1998: 24).
As had been admitted by the Israeli officials themselves, the Israeli attitude after 1969 
toward the Arabs was not much suggestive. They suggested “either full contractual 
peace without full Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories or continuation of 
the status quo without any concessions” (Shlaim, 2004: 297); the status quo 
unacceptable for the Arabs, which was maintained by the following “diplomacy of 
attrition” the one which eventually led to the full-scale fighting in the 1973 war.
The civil war in Jordan was seen by the Arab states not as an internal matter, but as a 
matter of concern for the entire Arab nation. They went on to state that instead of 
directing the arms fought in the crisis in the direction of Israel, they fought their 
fellow people. This was another reason for the intervention of the other Arab states 
into the war. The other side of the inter-Arab anxiety was that the crisis factor was 
amidst the continuing swinging in the Arab world between the vested interests of 
sovereignty and the common cause that they pledged to defend. Here, the national 
interests played the prominent role, seen in their hesitation to take one side or the 
other in the crisis (Barnett, 1998). Because to stand on the side of Jordan, would be 
seen as the betrayal of the Palestinians, to stand on the latter side would be the 
challenge to a fundamental tenet of a political order (ibid). But that the majority of the 
interested countries sufficed themselves with the verbal statements instead of the 
directly interfering in the conflict yet again proved that the states rather preferred to 
take up the stances that would be of less danger to the regimes they maintained in 
their own countries, and would spare the condemnation of the radical Arab states and 
the powers that definitely superseded them militarily, that is Israel and the United 
States. Besides, it helped to avoid more material losses that could be harmful to the 
already shattered states’ economies.
Another summit, held in September 22 amidst the Jordanian crisis and aimed to 
discussion of the possible means of halting its development, showed the inability of 
the Arab states to reach the firm common solution that would be equally acceptable to 
the majority of the participants. The summit ended in the signature of the Cairo 
Agreement between the PLO and Jordan. According to Adeed Dawisha, the
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conference was a “turning point in the history of inter-Arab relations no less 
important than the Arab defeat of 1967. It marked the gradual decline of the 
Palestinian movement as a radicalizing and destabilizing factor in Arab politics” 
(quoted in Barnett, 1998). The Palestinian factor remained the important factor in the 
Arab-Israeli relations, however now it could be described as a matter of Arab rhetoric 
rather than the practical actions. It served as the basis to keep the conflict going and 
as the means of mobilizing the resources and the leverage to the domination of the 
region under a leader’s rule.
The issue also became problematic for the leaders, mainly of Jordan and Lebanon 
since the mid-1970s had to find the common grounds in between the Palestinians and 
the sovereignty of their own countries, the factor that influenced their positions in the 
broader Arab-Israeli conflict, and invested in their cautiousness in taking political 
decisions both during multilateral and bilateral negotiations with Israel.
Given these events and the coming of the new leader in Egypt, the region experienced 
another turning point, though not much dramatic but the one that defined the outcome 
of the period. Anwar Sadat, who was one of the military members who participated in 
the coup in Egypt in 1951, unlike Nasser, did not enjoy the prestige and the love of 
the neighboring leaders and the people correspondingly, the point that in a way rid 
him of the burden to recover personally from the past defeats. He did not possess the 
charisma that Nasser had, and was less clear in his future plans in relation to the 
conflict. At first, he was treated by suspicion by the Arab leaders, but later appeared 
the one who exercised the continuity o f Nasser’s policies aimed at the recovering the 
lost lands and reaching the kind of a solution with Israel. He acted in accordance with 
Nasser’s statement that “that was taken by force cannot be retaken but by force.”
His arrival brought the changes into the Arab politics, and he showed clearly where 
his priorities lay (Freedman, 1979: 97). These priorities concerned in most part the 
national interests. Upon his coming to power, he changed the official name of Egypt 
“United Arab Republic”, still the remnant of the union with Syria, which withdrew in 
1961, into the “Arab Republic of Egypt.”
At this time, Asad, who showed himself a pragmatist during the Jordanian crisis, 
became the president of Syria. The two events influenced the realignment of forces in 
the Arab world and were the direct steps to the war of 1973 (Freedman, 1979: 97). 
Despite the attempts of the two leaders to still reach partial solutions to the conflict 
with Israel, the steps they took were the ones toward peace and war. Sadat was the
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first leader who ever mentioned the possibility of peace with Israel publicly. When 
the UN special representative to the region, Gunnar Jarring addressed Egypt and 
Israel with the proposals to resolve the dispute between the two, Egypt replied, that it 
“will be ready to enter into peace agreement with Israel containing all the 
aforementioned obligations mentioned in Security Council Resolution 242” (Shlaim, 
2004: 299). Egypt also made a number of additional demands: an Israeli commitment 
to withdraw not only from Sinai but also from the Gaza Strip, a commitment to settle 
the refugee problem in accordance with UN resolutions, and the establishment of a 
UN force to maintain the peace (ibid: 300). Rabin, at that time the Israeli ambassador 
to Washington, reflected that this statement was the milestone and that “for the first 
time in the chronicle of the Middle East conflict, and Arab country -indeed, the 
largest Arab country and the leader of the Arab world-had issued an official 
document expressing its readiness to enter into a peace agreement with Israel!” 
(Quoted in Shlaim, 2004: 3001). However, the proposal was rejected by Israel, the 
move that made Sadat take up the issue of the preparation for war for serious 
consideration and turn him in the direction of making the alliances with Saudi Arabia 
and Syria, the countries formerly the enemies o f Egypt. Besides, he needed to gain 
the personal strength in the eyes of the Arab leaders, because he experienced the 
grievances o f the domestic actors and those of the Arab world on the account of his 
failure to go to war, which he already mentioned in 1971. Thus, Sadat consolidated 
the alliance with Saudi Arabia. Besides, he expelled the Soviet advisors from Egypt 
in July 1972, the move considered by Israel as a fading away of the military option 
(ibid: 315).
Besides, the relations of Egypt and Jordan started to deteriorate in the light of the 
Jordanian Federal Plan, under which there would be the federation of the Jordanian 
part consisting of the East Bank with the capital in Amman, and the Palestinian part 
incorporating the West Bank and Gaza with the capital in East Jerusalem, with the 
common administration. King Hussein did not find the endorsement of his plan from 
any part, and was “caught between his inability to sustain the war with Israel and his 
unwillingness to make a common cause with the radicals” (ibid: 315).
Sadat also forged the alliance with the radical Syria “and the two nations were able to 
coordinate their preparations for war” (Freedman, 1979: 98). The two alliances in 
their turn brought the improvement of relations between Syria and Saudi Arabia, a 
diplomatic revolution in the words of Freedman, who also considers the reconciliation
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between Syria and Jordan whose forces had battled in September 1970, the 
consequence of Sadat’s diplomatic efforts (Freedman, 1979: 98).
One of the reasons why Sadat decided to go to war was that he could not see any 
other solution to the existing situation in the region in general and in relation to the 
conflict with Israel. The attack on Israel in October 1973 is considered by many 
analysts to have been aimed not so much at the infliction of a military defeat on 
Israel, but rather as a means to break the political deadlock and also gain for Sadat a 
personal strength that he lacked and which gained him the consolidated position both 
in the eyes of his fellow Arab leaders and the credentials for the further negotiations 
with Israel on the further rapprochement with this state and acting on the basis most 
suitable for the internal country conditions, like this consolidating the nation-state, 
sovereignty orientation.
Moreover, he managed to mobilize the Arab forces in a more effective way, unlike 
the previous Arab-Israeli wars, whereby Egypt and Syria had been able to mount a 
coordinated attack on Israel, with both Jordan and Iraq aiding Syria in the later stages 
of fighting (Freedman, 1979: 99). The Saudi Arabian decision to impose an oil 
embargo during the conflict on the United States, Israel’s main ally, was further 
evidence of the diplomatic effectiveness of the Egyptian leader (ibid: 99). Freedman 
sees a share of irony in these events, for “his [Sadat] ability to wage the war 
successfully in its initial stages were to provide the Egyptian leader with the domestic 
support to move toward a peace treaty with Israel in the aftermath of the conflict” 
(Freedman, 1979: 99).
The atmosphere of defeatism, military weakness, hesitation and the quest for revenge 
characterized the Arab-Israeli conflict in the period between the two wars: 1967 and 
1973. On the one hand the positions that the Arab states took gave a vague hope for 
some sort of a political settlement with Israel, but on the other the closer look at how 
the states behaved presents an obvious military outcome. Despite the realistic 
attitudes of the states towards the handling of the rivalry and inter-regional affairs, the 
Arab frontline states, and “sideline” states were not ready to conclude any agreement 
with Israel. Influenced by different factors the states acted rather categorically in their 
attitudes. They had too much at stake to let Israel take up an equal position among 
them and be treated as a full-member actor in the regional affairs: their domestic
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prestige, economic weakness, fragility of regimes, and still unclear order of mutual 
relations. With the war of 1967 they had been involved too deep into the conflict with 
Israel and the defending of the Palestinian cause, in a way unexpected for themselves; 
so that they had to define what roles they were now to play in these events and on 
what grounds to formalize the positions. The matter was complicated for the Arab 
states even more with the uncertainties of relations between each other and in the 
wake of the heated debates on the relevancy of pan-Arabic postulates and the extent 
to which this ideology could play in the policy-making. As the states still had been 
relatively young entities, given only the short period of time since the establishment 
of their nation-states, the latter concept and that of sovereignty needed to be defined 
for the countries in the context of their territorial entities.
Another point is that the coalitions that the states started to formalize also took up a 
somewhat different form, based on the realistic and pragmatic calculations of the 
participants rather than ideologically determined claims.
Despite the fact that the Arab states tried to present their official stances as the ones 
of the non-compromising actors, the practice showed for them, that amidst the 
circumstances, such approach could not work, as they soon realized that they could 
not boldly stay on a road of realizing of their dream of “wiping off Israel from the 
surface of the Earth, and throwing the Jews into the see.” And that the states launched 
the October war, as has been mentioned, was a move not to achieve their final aim, 
but rather reverse the political humiliation of the 1967 defeat. The new stage of the 
conflict opened up for the Arab states to react to the conflict with Israel from another 




1973- 1980s: The Opening Prospects for Settlement
4.1. Changed Environment in the Region
There exists the agreement in the literature on the topic that the war of October 1973 
served as a “sobering effect” for the parties to the conflict. It changed the political 
deadlock, much desired by the Arab states and established the balance-of-power in 
the region where the previous assurance of the Israeli invincibility was quite shaken 
and it gave the hopes for the positive direction in the settlement of the rivalries 
between the Arab states and Israel. That Egypt and Syria managed to take advantage 
in the initial stages of the attack to recapture almost all o f the territories lost in the 
1967 war, and the fact that the Arab states succeeded in establishing the 
unprecedently working coalition of countries in the fight with Israel, brought the 
restoration of the lost in the 1967 war Arab pride and superiority of their strategic 
will, even if militarily Egypt and Syria appeared on the losers’ side. It was the 
psychological “victory” of the Arab states and especially Egypt (Bickerton, Klausner, 
1998: 187). The war reversed defeatism of the 1967 aftermath, and marked the 
prevailing psychology of the Arab-Israeli conflict as of mutual fear and mistrust, and 
the realization that the enemy was capable of inflicting serious wounds in any future 
conflict (Kamrava, 2005: 137). This realization in a way paved the way for the 
prospects for the hopes of the resolution of the conflict between the Arab and Jewish 
people.
The period that followed is described as the one where the conflict between the Arab 
and Jewish people now took place in a different environment, both regional and 
international. On the international level the situation was of the growing involvement 
of the conflicting sides of the Cold War into the region as the platform of competition 
for the influence, therefore new coalitions of states were to be established leaning
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though not officially to one side or the other, and enjoying the support and backing of 
either. As Galal El-Rashidi described, the years that followed “witnessed fundamental 
shifts in the global as well as Middle Eastern balances of power. The pre-war power 
alignments have been radically dispersed” and the old order could not be restored 
(Rashidi, 1977: 73). Rashidi (1977), pointed to the new realities that emerged in the 
region, one of which was that the members o f the region had realized the basic 
requirements for the durable peace, among which were the new military capabilities 
of the states, which influenced the choice between the war or peace, and that for more 
states the continuation of conflict between Israel and the Arab states became 
unacceptable (ibid: 73).
In this light the states started to rethink their national priorities, which acquired 
stronger elements of statism, and more states showed the growing trend toward a 
political settlement with Israel. Most Arab states, including the confrontation states 
and Saudi Arabia, were more politically and psychologically prepared than ever 
before to negotiate a final settlement with Israel (Khouri: in Haley; Snider, 1979: 
163).
Besides, the financial factor came to play an important factor both in inter-Arab and 
international relations, which had been successfully used by the Arab states in 
influencing external powers in order to extract the mediation to the conflict and also 
played an important role in how the Arab states determined their positions in the 
conflict with Israel. The financial factor is related to the fact that the Arab states, 
particularly the oil producing states, and the ones related to the radical camp, for the 
first time used the oil power to express their influence (Shlaim, 2004; Rashidi, 1977; 
Sela, 1998). As Sela describes, “the Arab media maintained its trust in the oil weapon 
as a major source of influence in the international arena and one that needed to be 
exploited to wrest more territory from Israel, underlying the general desire to proceed 
the path of diplomacy” (Sela, 1998: 162).
The oil wealth was the factor of how Saudi Arabia came into the position of power 
and preeminence in Arab politics (Barnett, 1998). “With such power, the Saudis 
hoped to protect themselves from various threats and challenges from other Arab 
states through checkbook diplomacy and “political petrolism” (ibid). The country 
tried to reach an alliance with the United States and Egypt, and such an alignment 
came into existence after the 1973 war, which was characterized as an “axis” (ibid). 
The two countries had similar interest in alienating the Soviet Union as a threat to
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their interests and acquiring the United States as the potential force in reaching the 
compromise solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict (ibid). The trend points to the states’ 
not directly involved in the conflict with Israel to leverage themselves to it in order to 
preserve the influence in the region. Such moves point to the materialist and realist 
considerations of states’ policy making unlike the previously ideologically based 
calculations.
The “oil weapon” was one of the crucial means that brought the United States into the 
deeper engagement in the regional diplomatic process and developing by the country 
of the “Arab policy.” The latter involvement helped bring about the disengagement 
agreements between Israel and Egypt, and Israel and Syria, and the further Israeli- 
Egyptian peace agreement, though condemned by majority of the Arab states. 
According to Sela, the powerful effect of Arab oil on world opinion was reflected in a 
boosted Arab self-confidence, and the feeling that “new era had begun in Arab 
history” (Sela, 1998: 171). The Arab attitude toward the use of the oil weapon 
remained firm as long as no progress was achieved on Israeli withdrawal from 
Egyptian territory (ibid: 171). However, as Avraham Sela points, Arab oil producers 
never lost sight of economic considerations, which reflects the pragmatism of these 
states, and the context of reality which the states took into consideration, and not just 
acted based on their rabid ideological proclamations. Sela explains that they were to 
use the oil weapon until Israel retreated to the 1967 borders and the rights of the 
Palestinians were restored. They were to sustain the oil embargo for as long as the 
losses did not exceed one quarter of their 1972 revenues, that is, the end to reducing 
of oil production (Sela, 1998: 171). Political conditions for ending the oil embargo 
ripened once the Israeli-Egyptian agreement on disengagement of forces was signed 
in 1974, and the United States made any further brokering between Israel and the 
Arabs strictly conditional on lifting the embargo. Despite Syria’s opposition to that, 
the embargo came to its official and unconditional end on March 18, 1974, after being 
virtually approved by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Algeria (ibid: 171).
Another point that can be said to characterize the period and the result of the 1973 
war is that the Arab states formulated their central demands: a return to the borders of 
4 June 1967 and establishment of an independent Palestinian state (Shlaim, 2004: 
328). This was the period when the Arab states formulized the “comprehensive” 
approached towards the Arab-Israeli conflict, the stance which they firmly maintained 
throughout further negotiations and attempts to negotiations. The unwillingness and
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impossibility conditioned by different factors to deviate from this approach served as 
one of the major reasons for the halt in development of the solution for the Arab- 
Israeli conflict.
The Palestinian issue gained the core role in the conflict, and the PLO received rather 
substantial authority and political weight and was recognized to be the sole 
representative of the Palestinian people during Rabat summit in 1974.
Lebanon, the state that to this time had played rather passive role in the Arab-Israeli 
rivalries, entered the conflict as a “full-scale” participant and became the victim of the 
internal civic rivalries and the means of the Palestinian fight for the national rights 
with Israel on the one hand, and the platform of inter-Arab rivalry for regional 
domination on the other. These rivalries left the state, which heretofore based its 
political environment on the principle of national consensus, in the condition of 
internal instability and crisis for many years ahead. It also became the object of both 
sides of the conflict, Israeli and Arab states’ of achieving the zero-sum outcome in 
their confrontation (for instance Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982). The 
Palestinians, “desperate and alone, sought solace in violence. And Lebanon, under the 
weight of its own fragile political system and Fedayeen attacks, imploded into civil 
war” (Kamrava, 2005: 137).
The states needed to construct now their policies within new circumstances that had 
to define their interests best suitable to these circumstances and best applicable to the 
new realities. Even though some leaders still mentioned the pan-Arab and the 
“common cause” ideals, the majority of them acted on the pragmatic considerations. 
And even though the states still acted under the umbrella of nationalism, it was more 
of a declarative nature and the means to achieve their aims while not damaging the 
survival of the regimes or securing the external help. One state under this category is 
Syria, where much of the state’s legitimacy, as explained by Barnett, derived from its 
Arab credentials (Syrian identity is considered to be late in making if existent at all), 
thus fusing the relationship between domestic stability and its Arabism. When Egypt 
withdrew from the Arab cause after the 1973 war, Syria increasingly portrayed itself 
as the caretaker and defender of the Arab nationalism (Barnett, 1998).
The countries emerged from the war with interests diverging in some ways or the 
others from those of their fellow countries’, and had different concerns and schedules 
(Barnett, 1998). For some states, like Egypt, which completely oriented itself towards 
“state-first” priorities, the political settlement with Israel constituted the first priority,
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and therefore Sadat tried to find the ways how to achieve it as soon as possible. The 
Egyptian president stood on the position of reclaiming the territories by diplomatic 
means and not the military encounters (ibid). Such desire was attributed to the 
country’s shackled economy and deteriorating socio-economic internal situation, 
hence its desire to attract the foreign and domestic economic capital. Besides, Egypt 
was set on its changing role in the world and regional politics, the fact that made it 
take up the reorientation from the Soviet Union, to the United States (ibid). Egypt was 
in a better position to seek peace with Israel than any other Arab state, because the 
Egyptians felt very strong identification with their own past and cultural heritage. 
They have always seen themselves as Egyptians as well as Muslims or Arabs 
(Bickerton, Klausner, 1998: 187). For Sadat the first priority was to establish peace 
with Israel and the question of Palestinian nationhood was of no urgency for him 
(ibid: 187).
For other states, like Jordan, the paramount issue was regime survival. Jordan 
represents the state which has always been in between the regional powers, it beard 
the largest amount of the Palestinian refugees, and lacked the defined state-national 
identity (Barnett, 1998). Based on these grounds and unlike Egypt, King Hussein 
could not completely abandon the pan-Arab symbolism, for it was the basis of his 
legitimacy. Therefore the solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict was to be based for him 
on getting the West Bank and East Jerusalem under his control, which in its turn 
would consolidate his authority. Jordan was the state to which Israel turned to 
concluding any sort of settlement after the October war, however, there were no 
substantial results. King Hussein hoped for a partial agreement with Israel with the 
partial withdrawal of the latter from the West Bank, and full peace agreement in 
return for complete Israeli withdrawal (Shlaim, 2004: 331), however it was rejected 
by Israel, which denied any partial agreement with Jordan due to the fact that the 
latter did not participate in the military action during the October war (ibid). And for 
Jordan any final agreement with Israel would have meant the political solution which 
would have been unacceptable both for his country’s people and the fellow Arabs, 
and be considered as betrayal (ibid).
For the PLO in the new circumstances, the basic interest was their representation at 
the bargaining table, for Israel refused any negotiations with it. Besides, it faced the 
divisions within itself, where some groups were prone to reconciliation on the key 
issues of their statehood, and national determination; and the radical fractions, which
52
in their turn had been indistinguishable from the Arab states that provided their 
financial backing (Barnett, 1998).
These varying interests of the states came visibly to the fore when the Arab states 
held two conferences- in Algiers, in November 1973, and Rabat in October 1974, 
after the October’s war end- in order to negotiate the further approaches toward 
handling the Arab-Israeli conflict. The states divided in their stances into the 
“rejectionists”, including Iraq, Algeria, and most of the Palestinian organizations, and 
the moderates, who were willing to try to work out a settlement with Israel, including 
Egypt, Jordan, Syria and some “moderate” Palestinian factions, Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait (Snider, 1979: 183). But within the latter camp, the states were divided too on 
the means of reaching that settlement, which complicated the resolution of the Arab- 
Israeli conflict.
The divisions within Arab states were conditioned by the territorial gains that the 
states opted to extract and, as has been mentioned, by the expectations for direct 
financial aid from the conservative oil producers (Sela, 1998:154).
Due to Bickerton and Klausner, the whole question of Arab unity was one of the 
major problems of Arab diplomacy (1998: 190). It was believed that agreement 
among the Arab states was necessary for an enduring peace (ibid: 190).
4.2. Beginning of Political Process
In the aftermath of the October war, Egypt and Israel signed the disengagement 
agreement (January 1974) which provided for a withdrawal of Israeli troops from 
both sides of the Suez Canal, and the enhancement of the United Nations force 
between Egyptian and Israeli forces in the Sinai Peninsula, the agreement, and not the 
peace treaty, which provided the first step in “reaching a final, just and durable peace 
according to the provisions of the Security Council Resolution 338” (see Appendix 5) 
(Freedman, 1979: 99). This act indicated the beginning of the political process in the 
direction of the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and gave the promising 
grounds for the bargaining of the settlement. However, these had been accompanied 
by complications which cast a shade on the hopes of reaching a solution.
One of them came with the Syrian refusal to sign the similar disengagement 
agreement with Israel, due to the resistance to any political settlement, especially a 
unilateral, as it could influence the final settlement and breach the decisions taken at 
the summit in Algiers in November, 1973 (Barnett, 1998). The summit in Algiers is
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important in that it was the forum for the Arab states to discuss their future position 
on the Arab-Israeli conflict in the light of the newly appeared circumstances. The 
central issue that the states touched upon concerned yet again the dilemma of bilateral 
or unilateral handling of the conflict, like during the summit in Khartoum post 1967 
war, however, here it was clear that the states now had to make the decision which 
was in a large way influenced by the power struggle for regional domination. This 
struggle caused the hindering effect on the states’ accommodation with Israel, who by 
the acceptance of the resolutions 242 and 338, admitted Israel’s legitimacy, and 
implied that the Arabs were willing to end the state of war with Israel (Sela, 1998: 
157).
The summit did not sanction Sadat and Hafiz al-Asad to continue their negotiations 
with Israel but instructed them not to act unilaterally on political issues that might 
affect a final settlement (Barnett, 1998), however, it had legitimized the use of 
diplomacy in the pursuit of the Arab goals (Sela, 1998: 155), but not in discordance 
with the principle of “comprehensive” settlement.
One more achievement of the summit was that the Arab states reached a strategy 
which was called “the interim goal of the Arab nation,” which was defined as the 
complete liberation of all the Arab lands occupied in June 1967, including “Arab 
Jerusalem,” and the commitment to the restoration of the national rights of the 
Palestinian people in accordance with the PLO’s decision (Sela, 1998: 156). This 
strategy, as noted by Sela (1998), created new guidelines for handling the conflict 
with Israel. That there were no “three no’s” of Khartoum indicated that the Arab 
actors concerned with maneuverability in the diplomatic process that had never been 
available before (ibid: 156).
Even in the light of such developments Syria still refused to sign the disengagement 
agreement with Israel, one of the reasons was the defeat on the battlefield, and despite 
its initial willingness to work out some kind of an agreement with Israel. The Syrians 
refused to recognize Israel as long as the Golan Heights were occupied (Kamrava, 
2005: 137).
For Asad, the peace process was less crucial, either economically or strategically; his 
regime was challenged by radical opponents at home as well as by hostile radical 
neighbor Iraq (Sela, 1998: 154). Besides, in Syria, the military elite was politicized 
and strongly committed to radical pan-Arab ideology (ibid: 154). In Egypt, on the 
other hand, the military was rather apolitical, and it was coupled by Egypt’s weight
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and leadership, and centralized decision-making (ibid: 153). Like this, Syria led the 
strategy of a collective approach in the diplomatic process aimed at preserving “Arab 
solidarity,” which would guarantee a comprehensive settlement (ibid: 154).
But notwithstanding these factors, on May 31, 1974 Syria signed the disengagement 
agreement with Israel, the move that explained by Rabil and Rienner as an 
inescapable option, for the country lost in the 1973 war the territories beyond the 
1967 cease-fire line. Moreover, as is marked by the authors, “this agreement is 
important because it was the first one to be signed by Israel and Syria under the 
auspices of the United States. Besides, it had been scrupulously observed by both 
parties since its inception” (Rabil; Rienner, 2003; 25). Rabil and Rienner described 
three factors that were responsible for the success of the agreement that included the 
one of Kissinger’s (who launched the “shuttle” or “step-by-step” diplomacy in the 
Middle East) backing by the US President Nixon, and he increased the U.S. input into 
the negotiations. Another one is that the US played the role of the moderator that also 
advanced its own positions. The third factor was that the US enlisted Arab support for 
its negotiations with Syria (ibid: 26).
The Israeli-Syrian agreement served as a precondition for Sadat for progress toward 
and additional Sinai settlement.
Rabat summit of October 1974 concerned the working out of the strategy of reaching 
the goals that the states agreed in Algiers. The summit’s most important resolution 
spelled the strong objection to any partial political settlement, repeating the “pan­
national and indivisible nature of the problem” (Sela, 1998: 163). Here the indicative 
feature of the situation was that, as Syrian president pointed, there existed the “unity 
of purpose between the Arab states, but disagreement over methods” (Freedman, 
1979): “the issue is not recovering a piece of land, but the way this is recovered.. .It is 
preferable for us that our land remains occupied than recovering it at the expense of 
our national dignity...” (Asad to Sadat, November 1977; taken from Sela, 1998: 151). 
Therefore, Sadat’s peacemaking diplomacy was diminishing Syria’s chance to 
recover its land and threatened its national security (ibid: 163).
This situation led to the emergence of the new coalitions of Arab states who were 
opposed to the bilateral settlement with Israel and on the terms not acceptable to the 
Arab states, and the states trying to affect the balance-of-power strategy toward Egypt 
through alignment with Jordan and the PLO. Both Syria and the PLO strongly 
criticized the Egyptian signing of the second disengagement agreement with Israel
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(Sinai II, which represented a breakthrough in Israeli-Egyptian relations because it 
included essential political elements) and adhered to a unified Arab diplomacy (ibid: 
163).
As is indicated by various scholars, the Sinai II accords arouse unpopular reaction in 
the Arab world, because it was seen by them as the diminishing of the chances of 
Israeli withdrawal from the occupied in the 1967 war lands, and that move eroded the 
political assets (in no little degree collective action) that they gained for the Arab 
world in October 1973.
Besides, the Egypt’s move was perceived as a dividing factor of the Arab world, and 
the diminishing of the broader conflict to a border conflict. The “rejectionist states” 
began to meet periodically to publicize their outrage at Egypt’s policies and 
interpretations of Arabism (Barnett, 1998).
Syria after the signing of Sinai II feared that by this agreement the elimination of 
Egypt from the confronting line with Israel would neutralize Syria’s demands for 
Israeli withdrawal from Golan Heights and participation of the Palestinians in the 
future peace settlement (Snider, 1979: 185). As Snider explains, without the credible 
military option Syria was in no position to press these demands, and in the absence of 
the credible military threat Israel would agree only to “cosmetic” adjustments of the 
armistice lines which would not disturb the military settlements it had established in 
the Golan Heights (ibid: 185).
Another significant outcome of the Rabat summit was the endorsement of the PLO as 
the “sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people” (Shlaim, 2004: 333). 
The latter fact significantly diminished the Jordanian authority, because this pointed 
to its inability to experience any success in recovering occupied territory (ibid: 333). 
This also implied the establishment of the independent Palestinian national authority, 
led by the PLO on any part of Palestine that was liberated (ibid: 333). This meant that 
the PLO “abandoned” the claim to all the lands o f the pre-Mandatory Palestine, which 
led to the internal divisions of the PLO. The moderate fractions, namely al-Fatah, led 
by Yasir Arafat, and the Syrian-controlled al-Sa’iqa, concluded that despite the 
violent opposition of their more militant and uncompromising opponents within the 
resistance movement it would be more realistic to scale down their maximum 
demands and goals (Haley, Snider, 1979: 163). The realist positions taken by these 
fractions allowed the PLO to be accepted to the Geneva conference, which was the 
turning point in the Arab-Israeli conflict (Sela, 1998: 158).
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The PLO’s final decision to adopt a pragmatic strategy, accepting the establishment 
of a mini-state in Palestine as a first phase in their national struggle, represented the 
impact of the main Arab proponents of this strategy on the Palestinian mainstream 
(ibid: 166). Moreover, as Sela (1998), points out, the adoption of this position 
demonstrated the fundamental change brought by the war in the Arab world’s 
priorities. This decision gave the PLO the veto power over any decision by the Arab 
states regarding the conflict with Israel. However, this was not to mean that the Arab 
states would allow the Palestinians to dictate the course of their policies, after the war 
in which they had scored unprecedented military and political achievements. 
Therefore, Sela continues, the underlying rhetoric of this decision was the Arab 
states’ need to legitimize a political settlement with Israel. Furthermore, by casting 
responsibility for everything relating to the Palestinian issue on the PLO, the Arab 
states took another step toward disengaging themselves from responsibility for the 
Palestinian issue and enhancing their own freedom of action regarding bilateral 
settlements with Israel (Sela, 1998: 166). According to some scholars in the field (e.g. 
Kamrava, 2005), at this point the Arab-Israeli conflict was equalized with the Israeli- 
Palestinian conflict because the major stumbling point in any negotiations concerned 
the “self-determination” and establishment of the national home for the Palestinian 
people. This also proved the Arabs’ implying positions toward the state interests and 
manipulation of the issue of Palestine to their own advantage. Obviously, such a 
decision had been much propagated and facilitated by Egypt, in order to gain a free 
hand in its rapprochement with Israel.
The signing of the Sinai II accords and the changing role of the PLO invested in 
polarization of the inter-Arab politics which in its turn nourished the eruption of the 
Lebanese civil war, which turned that country into a battleground of conflicting 
ambitions, fears, and frustrated hopes (Sela, 1998: 175). The intensity, duration, and 
outcome of the conflict, and the gains and losses sustained by the various participants, 
affected the Arab states’ abilities to deal with one another and with Israel (Snider, 
1979: 179).
In the light of the Lebanese events Syria was the initiator of the formation of the 
“Eastern Front”, the aim of which was to deter a possible Israeli offensive against 
Damascus (ibid: 185). The “Eastern Front” referred to a line of confrontation states 
on Israel’s northern and eastern borders comprising Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and PLO 
entrenched in southern Lebanon (ibid: 185). The latter’s presence in the southern
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Lebanon as the result of the Jordanian crisis of 1971, was one of the major reasons of 
the eruption of the Lebanese crisis, for it started as a range of clashes between the 
Palestinian guerillas and the Lebanese Left. The Lebanese neutrality and passivity in 
the Arab-Israeli conflict, the principle included in the National Covenant, was aborted 
by the events that erupted after the signature of the Sinai II agreement which 
coincided with the crisis’ beginning. This accord contributed to the insecurity of the 
Lebanese Left and Right camps and to the outbreak of fighting (ibid: 182). The 
consequences o f the second Sinai agreement include the Arab consensus that 
Lebanon must remain an active frontline state in the struggle against Israel.
The Lebanese crisis, which started as the internal inter-communal one and 
transformed into the major ground of the Arab-Israeli conflict can be said to have 
served the beginning of the impasse in the political process towards the settlement of 
the conflict. Syria used the crisis to consolidate its own initiative to enhance the 
bargaining position. The country adopted the strategy of self-reliance, based on the 
consolidation of its own standing as a leading regional power (Sela, 1998: 175). For 
Asad, the Lebanese crisis provided the opportunity to assert control over Palestinian 
forces and to deter Israel from filling the power vacuum (Schultz, 199: 62). Besides, 
the decision of Asad to bring the Syrian armed forces into the country brought Syria 
one step closer to fulfilling its territorial claims as well as to demonstrate that Asad 
was the most effective leader of the Arab world (ibid: 63). So, Lebanon became the 
key factor in the Syrian-Israeli deterrence dialogue, and the surrogate battlefield for 
the Israeli- Palestinian conflict after the PLO’s move to Beirut (ibid: 63).
For Syria the dramatic change in the status quo in the country represented the danger 
for its security, which in its turn could have an uncertain impact on the relations with 
Israel (Weinberger, 1986: 71). The fear was that Israel would use the crisis as an 
excuse to occupy the southern Lebanon along the Litani River, which would increase 
the vulnerability of Damascus in case of war with Israel (ibid: 71). Besides, Israel 
could use the disorder in Lebanon to discredit the possibility of the realization by the 
PLO of the concept of a secular democratic Palestine (ibid: 71).
Another consequence of the conflict was that it brought deeper divisions within the 
Arab world in the second phase of the crisis, which took place in the January of 1976, 
with the dissolution of the Eastern Front, formed by Syria, where only Jordan 
remained the member, due to its sideline position and the lack of opportunities to 
choose from.
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The initial position of the Arab states was to object any unilateral interference in the 
crisis and to prevent its spread into a broader Arab-Israeli confrontation, however, 
later the idea of the broader Arab role was accepted (including Egypt and Saudi 
Arabia, who opposed it the most) in the absence of another solution. With this they 
showed once gain the pragmatism of their actions, and by the autumn of 1976 the 
countries recognized that they had to end the civil war in Lebanon and establish the 
solidarity among the Arabs to meet the challenge posed by the prospect of a 
negotiated settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict (ibid: 75). This materialized during 
the mini-summit in Riyadh (see Appendix 6) which was attended by Yasir Arafat, the 
president of Egypt, Syria and Lebanon. The decision taken at the summit was to end 
the inter-Arab quarreling for the sake of reestablishing solidarity and enabling the 
Arab states to play a constructive role in bringing the end to the civil strife in 
Lebanon. The Riyadh summit was followed by the summit o f all the members of the 
Arab League in Cairo (see Appendix 7), which endorsed the resolutions o f the Riyadh 
conference and set up a fund to support an Arab peacekeeping in Lebanon (ibid: 76). 
The Cairo summit resulted in the resumption of the Egypt-Saudi Arabia-Syria 
coalition, which accounted for the period of outstanding inter-Arab coordination on 
the diplomatic effort toward Israel (Sela, 1998: 189). The countries represented the 
counterbalance to the radical states, and set on the promoting of the comprehensive 
approach (Israeli withdrawal to the pre-June 1967 borders, establishment of a 
Palestinian state, and termination of the state of war with Israel), the goals to be 
achieved during the Geneva Conference with the participation of the PLO (ibid: 189). 
However, the PLO by becoming a full partner in the civil war earned the stamp on its 
image as a national liberation movement and exposed it to inter-Arab conflicting 
pressures (Sela, 1998: 179). Such weakening of the prestige of the PLO left the mark 
on the Arab posture and the comprehensive approach, which later led to the Egyptian 
unilateral peace agreement with Israel which disregarded the Palestinian issue, and it 
became isolated from the Arab world political arena until the late 1980s.
Here it is notable that the Palestinian issue became to play an ambiguous role in the 
overall Arab-Israeli conflict. On the one hand, as has been mentioned above, the 
frontline states deviated from the Palestinian question and turned to the issues of the 
enhancement of their state authority, legitimacy, and economic development, which 
was a more realistic undertaking than the vague quest for the pan-Arab unity or the 
liberation of the historic Palestine (Miller, 1987: 5). On the other hand, the states
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could not abandon the issue completely, since it was a means to preserve those 
essential aspects they had turned to.
Moreover, since the states now fought for the taking up of the leading positions in the 
region and maintaining the newly emerged balance-of-power, they needed the 
Palestinian issue as the means to that end. When Sadat concluded the agreement with 
Israel, Syria, for instance, dramatically increased the importance it attached to the 
Palestinian issue. It could not allow the resolution of the Palestinian problem based on 
a Jordanian option, where a Palestinian entity would fall under the influence of the 
Jordanian regime and hence under the Israelis, that would reduce its position in the 
Arab arena and increase its isolation (ibid: 41). This situation carried important 
implications for the Arab-Israeli conflict and for the states’ domestic and regional 
policies, and also severely limited the flexibility of those states interested in moving 
into a negotiated settlement with Israel (ibid: 5). This explains the severe reactions of 
the most of the Arab states on the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement signed in March 
1979. The fear of betraying Palestinian interests by negotiating with Israel made it 
difficult for the regimes to depart from the Arab consensus. The Egyptian case was 
different because, according to Miller, Sadat’s willingness “to go it alone” resulted 
from unique circumstances difficult for the Arab states to follow (Miller, 1987: 6).
The Palestinian issue was linked to the long-term stability of Jordan and Lebanon and 
intertwined with Syria’s image and interests in the region that finding a solution 
compatible with these diverse pressures and interests was difficult (ibid: 7).
The most important point of that agreement was the exclusion of the Palestinians and 
the creation of the Palestinian state from the agreement, seen as the betrayal from the 
side of Egypt. Besides, the Camp David agreement ignored the thorny question of 
Jerusalem and the future of the Golan Heights (Beckerton, Klausner, 1998: 199).
If Jordan agreed to go into negotiations with Israel, it could have been used by the 
radical regimes to put the Palestinian demands to undercut King Hussein’s position 
(Miller, 1987: 5).
Saudi Arabia, with the strong Islamic traditions in all the sphere of the country’s life, 
could not have endorsed the agreement that did not mention the third holiest city after 
Mecca and Medina, that is Jerusalem (Bickerton, Klausner, 1998: 201). Syria, could 
not agree to any negotiations without mentioning the Golan Heights, and it feared the 
threat to its own security that grew since the country was rid of the military ally, 
Egypt, and it perceived the situation as the one that gave a free hand for Israel in case
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of the armed conflict. The Egyptian peace with Israel was seen as the threat to the 
balance of power in the region and led to the alignment of the Arab states in order to 
maintain it. Such an alignment was detrimental for Egypt, since this and the peace 
agreement completely broke the state from the ideal of the Arab consensus, and left it 
isolated from the affairs of the Arab world. In the conference that followed the 
accords, in Baghdad, the nineteen members o f the Arab League issued a communiqué 
outlining political and economic sanctions against Egypt (ibid: 201). The states broke 
diplomatic relations with Egypt, it was suspended form the twenty two-member Arab 
League, the Islamic Conference, and ousted from a number of financial and economic 
institutions as the Federation of Arab Banks and the Organization of Arab Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (ibid: 202). Besides, the headquarters of the Arab League had 
been moved from Cairo to Tunis. Another consequence of the Camp David was that 
the Arab states increased their suspicion of Israel and the United States, and Israel in 
its turn hardened its attitudes toward the Arabs, that had negative implications on the 
further resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
4.3. Conflict Shift
With the disappearance of Egypt as a pivotal state in the regional Arab arena, and the 
events that took place by the beginning of the 1980s, the Arab core concern shifted to 
a bi-focal conflict system, as described by Sela (1998), with the boosted inter-Arab 
competition for the resources and relegating the conflict with Israel as secondary on 
the Arab agenda.
The crises that took place in the 1980s both inter-Arab and Arab-Israeli, namely the 
Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 shifted the attention of the Arab states to other 
priorities and served as an indication of their weaknesses and inability to react 
constructively to the events.
The Israeli invasion of Lebanon aimed at eliminating of Palestinian presence and 
influence in the country, establishing the new political order there with the 
strengthening of the Maronite government, expulsion of Syrian troops, and 
destruction of Palestinian national resistance movement on the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip, turned into a prolonged war, which had an impact on the Arab stances towards 
the conflict with Israel (Schultz, 1999: 65).
The war produced another shift in the Arab-Israeli conflict where the military option 
was nullified; it isolated Syria (which now became the major confrontation state in
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the conflict) in the Arab world, and intensified inter-Arab divisions and regional 
threats to domestic stability (Sela, 1998: 217). Due to its continuous threat of 
insecurity vis-á-vis Israel, Syria can be said to be the only state among the 
confrontational states, to be interested in the military clashes with Israel, however, it 
could not act alone in that direction, and mobilized the efforts towards making a 
coalition for support. This state became the major opponent of the peace process 
which was resumed as a result of the Iran-Iraq war that accumulated the Arab and 
international efforts, which remained the stalemate due to Syria’s veto power (ibid: 
218) (note 1).
The Arab paralysis on the account of the conflict with Israel and their relations to the 
PLO was demonstrated by the Israeli war in Lebanon in 1982, and put to test the Arab 
states’ commitment to the PLO as a political structure as well as to the region’s order 
and stability (ibid: 247). As analyzed by Sela (1998), the war illustrated “the 
conditional nature of Arab support for its cause and the treats to its independence 
from jealous regimes such as Syria’s.”
Another significant outcome was that the war brought the realism in the states’ 
policy-making, and realization of the necessity of the political and diplomatic means, 
and flexibility as a means of survival and tangible gains in the Arab-Israeli relations 
(ibid: 247). As considered by academics in the field, the situation produced by the 
war was the one similar to the post 1967 period, with the sense of despair, division, 
and political impotence.
The Arab states’ inaction in defending the Palestinian contingent in Lebanon, and its 
subsequent refuge to other countries was accompanied by the mutual accusations, 
however, to no realistic and constructive option in dealing with the problems. This 
factor invested in the shift of the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict to that of the Israeli- 
Palestinian conflict, and shift of the conflict with Israel for the Arab states to the 
second priority position.
The repercussions of the invasion can be seen in the increase of the Palestinian 
nationalism in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, regardless of the fact that now the 
Palestinian leaders had to act from the territories with no direct borders with Israel 
(namely Tunisia, where Arafat, the leader of the PLO, found the refuge after the 
Israeli invasion of Lebanon) (Schultz, 1999: 69). The lack of border access to Israel 
effected the shifting of the PLO strategy towards a more diplomatic level. These two 
elements in the Palestinian cause, the rising nationalism and at the same time shift in
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strategy, made it possible for the Palestinians to gain the international recognition, 
which together with the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement is seen as the precedent and 
the basic framework for the peace process that set on going in the beginning of the 
1990s.
The distinctive feature of the period was that it was characterized by the appearance 
of a large number of the conflicts between the Arab states (the most prominent of 
them was that between Iraq and Iran). This and the changes within the internal realms 
of the countries (for instance Iran revolution) distracted the attention of the Arab 
states from dealing with the broader Arab-Israeli conflict, which invested into the 
appearance of the impasse in the conflict resolution. The conflicts which the region 
now faced were territorially based and indicated the desire for strategic influence 
rather than an attempt by a regime to increase its popularity by manufacturing or 
playing up an external grievance, as explained by Barnett (1998). Here the conflict 
within the Arab states started to be militarized and the disputes between the states 
derived from realpolitik impulses that can be attached to their growing statism, 
particularism, and fragmentation (ibid).
As has been noted earlier, the lack of unity, considered to be one of the most 
important factors in effective relations of the Arab states with Israel, complicated the 
affairs. Instead the region faced the growing sub-regionalization of relations with the 
emergence of the new sub-regional organizations, based both on the territorial 
proximity and economic factors, the issue high on the agenda of the states due to 
deteriorated economic situation as the result of the numerous conflicts and the 
fluctuations in the oil prices as another consequence, which negatively affected the 
countries. For instance, threatened by Iran’s Shi’i revolution, and the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan, to their national security, the Gulf monarchies established a separate 
sub-regional cooperation council of the Gulf monarchies (Sela, 1998: 218). The 
alignments, according to Sela, had been determined by proximity and a threat posed 
by Iran’s Islamic revolution. Besides, as the states turned their attention now to the 
state interests the Arab League, all-Arab organization was not enough to 
accommodate those interests, away from the pan-Arab level (Barnett, 1998). This 
approach questioned the appropriateness of the Arab League, and the states dedicated 
a lot of attention to discussing on the more effective forums for expression of their 
localized identities and interests. Another result of such contemplations materialized 
in the creation of the Arab Cooperation Council in February 1989, formed by Iraq,
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Jordan, Yemen, and Egypt (which returned into the Arab arena by the time, due to the 
Arab states’ failure of the sanctions against it). Therefore, the states were engaged in 
the coordination of efforts and actions between these sub-regional organizations and 
between them and the Arab League, devoting less attention to the conflict with Israel 
and the Palestinian issue.
Even though the realignments of the Arab states gave much freer hand for the states 
in the international arena, the efforts to bring about another peace process did not 
bring much result. Despite the willingness of some states, namely Jordan, to return to 
the peace process, they lacked the support of the Arab states, and yet again showed 
their attachment to the Palestinian issue as a source of their political legitimacy. 
Besides, the PLO continued to be manipulated by the states as a leverage to dominate 
the region and political decisions. In 1985 Jordan and PLO concluded “the dialogue” 
which was mutually advantageous, for the PLO as a means to regain its strategic 
position and return its headquarters to Jordan to control the West Bank, and for 
Jordan it was a chance to get closer ties with Washington through the PLO which had 
support of the latter, and get the lacking Arab political legitimacy or political backing 
among the Palestinians to represent their cause (Sela, 1998: 286).
The states still considered the “strategic parity” with Israel as their priority in any 
proposals for the settlement, and in the light of the rift between the “radical” and 
“moderate” states, they could not find the common solution acceptable to all the 
sides. Besides, their reactions to the proposed plans for resolution of the conflict, like 
Fahd Plan (see Appendix 8), presented by the king of Saudi Arabia, as a pragmatic 
move in order to secure the Western links, and preserve the national security, and the 
aim of reducing contradictions between the Arab obligations and links with 
Washington (Sela, 1998: 174). The states yet again could not come to the common 
stance concerning the acceptance of the initiative and showed once again their 
acceptance of Israel as a political entity in the region, however, still had been cautious 
as to not give up their say in the course of the matters. The plan was to substitute the 
UN Resolution 242 but seen by the Arabs as the concessionist, and giving the free 
hand for Israel in the future negotiations (ibid: 279). However, as considered by Sela, 
the very fact of presenting such plan and Arab consideration of it served as a proof 
that for the majority of the Arab states formal acceptance, or even a peace agreement 
with Israel, was in principle no longer anathema (ibid: 280). The Saudi plan was 
another step forward in the Arab’s growing pragmatism toward Israel since 1967.
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In the conference that followed in Fez, Morocco, the Arab states eventually came to a 
common position on the future actions concerning the conflict with Israel, where they 
assigned the pivotal role to the PLO, however made rather vague statements 
concerning the recognition of Israel. This made the US and Israel reject the plan, 
though from the Arab perspective, the plan was significant because it avoided the 
“use of the war terminology, or intransigent rhetoric, it was also non-transitional, 
departing from the strategy of phases” (ibid: 284). As Sela also adds, “the final 
statement refrained form using the traditional phrase o f ‘the Arab-Zionist conflict,’ or 
its equivalent term, ‘the Palestine problem,’ which ignored the existence of Israel. 
Instead, the summit used the pragmatic term, ‘the Arab-Israeli conflict,’ ambiguously 
indicating acquiescence in Israel’s legitimate existence” (ibid: 284). This kind of an 
attitude was also conditioned by the shortfall in oil prices and the eroded bargaining 
position of the states on the international arena. By this kind of statements the states 
aimed to earn the American consent in order to bring it to the mediating position.
The 1985 “dialogue” between the Palestinians and Jordan deviated slightly from the 
Fez Plan in that it would confine the peace effort to the Palestinian sector, rather than 
the comprehensive settlement, it mentioned the framework of a confederation with 
Jordan as the basis for Palestinian independence, and it provided no reservations 
regarding Arab commitment to peace and to the instruments of its implementation 
(ibid: 288). These points pointed to the growing importance of the PLO in the conflict 
with Israel, which was seen during the concluding of the Oslo accords in 1993, where 
Israeli leader negotiated directly with Arafat, the first such precedent in the history of 
the Arab-Israeli conflict.
That the Palestinian issue was an important one and indispensable condition for any 
productive results in direction of resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict proved itself 
during the summit that followed the “dialogue.” It should be said that the efforts of 
different sides to the conflict to come to a common agreement came to no avail, for 
the states acted based on the considerations of their own advantages, which often 
went in disaccordance with the Palestinian interests, which undoubtedly invested into 
the impasse o f the diplomatic efforts during the second half of the 1980s. Moderate 
and radical states alike tried to use the Palestinian question and the matter of the 
latter’s statehood to extract concessions for them and gain more power over the entity 
to exercise the regional power. Even though the Amman Accord (i.e. “dialogue”) 
became the basis for diplomatic contacts between Jordan, the PLO, and the United
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States, it was underlined by the abstention of such important state as Syria to 
participate in it, and the proposed international conference. In general, the actions of 
the Arab states at the time only showed their reluctance to deal with the issue of 
Palestinian statehood firsthand, the fact which is considered by the scholars to have 
had the impact on the eruption of the Palestinian resistant movement Intifada 
(;uprising, or “shaking o ff,r). The political deadlock that arouse in the region, like in 
the 1960s, invested in the deterioration of the internal situations within countries, and 
in the occupied areas of the West Bank and Gaza. “The Palestinian society in the 
occupied territories was in the process of taking a growing role in national affairs at a 
time of political eclipse of the PLO. . . and the more the Arab world seemed divided 
and unable to threaten Israel’s national security, the more vulnerable its domestic 
front seemed to its socio-political core” (Sela, 1998. 294).
The war in Lebanon, the massacres in the refugee camps of Shatila and Sabra during 
the war, pointed to the inaction of the Arab states. These factors also contributed to 
the Intifada. After evacuation from Beirut of the PLO the Arab states showed their 
unwillingness to accept it, and the organization faced further isolation which on the 
other hand allowed it to become the forefront actor in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The 
trend of Arab states’ downgrading of the conflict with Israel as the second priority 
and the political deadlock in the peace process can be said to characterize the 
dynamics of Arab positions. This trend was well seen during the Amman summit 
conference where the Palestinian issue was relegated to the lowest point.
The general agreement in the literature is the one that the Arab states showed little 
response to the Intifada and produced minor help to the movement, both financial and 
political (Sela, 1998; Bickerton, Klausner, 1999; Rubbi, 2001): “The regimes’ official 
responses were slow and indecisive, attesting to the dilemma with which this 
unprecedented phenomenon of organized civil disobedience confronted them” (Sela, 
1998: 305). For the majority of the frontline states the major concern of the Intifada 
was to save their countries from the spill over into their own constituencies. With this 
phenomenon the states tried to maximize their individual benefits from it, both 
domestically and regionally. Sela makes an example of how the states used the media 
and public relations campaigns to show the rhetorical nature of their support. “Syria 
and Jordan conducted an intensive media and public relations campaign in support of 
the uprising, to improve their credibility and balance their strict measures to suppress 
spontaneous public manifestations of support for the Intifada. In Lebanon, the Amal’s
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[Lebanese president, successor of Gemayel] three-year siege of Palestinian refugee 
camps was lifted, apparently by Asad’s directive” (ibid).
The Intifada also influenced the more cautious Arab responses in the context of the 
conflict, and even though the states still had their ambitious plans towards shaping the 
regional order many of them had to take into consideration the Palestinian factor. For 
instance, in 1988 the American Secretary of State Schultz, issued a plan for future 
negotiations on the Arab-Israeli conflict, however it never received enthusiastic 
acceptance, since it lacked such explicit points as Palestinian self-determination, the 
creation of the independent Palestinian state, and the acceptance of the PLO as the 
subject of negotiations (Rubbi, 2001: 219). Jordan and Egypt expressed little concern 
toward the plan, like this trying to show their solidarity with the Palestinian cause and 
their attachment to it. However, the Schultz plan had its significance in that it became 
the platform for the Madrid international peace conference of 1991, indicating the 
changes that the regional parties’ stances underwent following the Gulf war of 1991 
(Sela, 1998: 307). The fact that the states expressed their concern for the Palestinian 
question can be explained by the raised position of PLO and Araft on the international 
arena, which could allow them to promote their own interests through PLO. For 
instance, Syria sought close coordination with the PLO because it could put Syria in a 
better regional position and in view of the American peace initiative, whose possible 
result in a separate Israeli-Palestinian agreement would effectively diminish Syria’s 
chances of ever retrieving the Golan (Sela, 1998: 308). Syria represents an example 
of the state, which never gave up its “Greater Syria” ambitions, and sought the 
solution to the conflict based on the comprehensive approach, so that to promote its 
own interests and not let Israel gain the more advantageous position which would rid 
Syria of the ability to recover its territory.
The Arab stances during this phase of the Arab-Israeli conflict reflected the major 
realism assumptions that point to the selfish, self-centered and competitive nature of 
states’ behavior. The provision of the state security and maintenance of state’s 
integrity and clear boundaries were the key concerns o f the Arab states. They 
determined their behavior based on their relative economic and military capabilities, 
hence the subsequent decisions for actions. Another such example was Jordan’s 
decision to give up the claims for the West Bank. This decision was made known 
during the Algiers summit in 1988, dubbed as “the Intifada summit” to indicate its 
goals to provide support for the Palestinian uprising. With his decision, King Hussein
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managed to refute the PLO’s claim to represent the Palestinians in the East Bank, and 
to insulate it from the winds of the Intifada (ibid: 310). The major result o f this 
decision, however, is considered to be elated to the question of the state-formation. 
According to Sela, the disengagement from the West Bank signaled the 
“Jordanization” of the Hashemite Kingdom and its consolidation as a sovereign 
nation-state based on real boundaries and political control (ibid: 310).
The major outcome of the extraordinary summit in Algiers reaffirmed the role of the 
PLO as the representative o f the Palestinian people in any negotiations and pledged 
its financial and diplomatic support for the Intifada (Shlaim, 2004: 458). The summit 
is viewed as an indication of the turning point of the Arab-Israeli conflict, with the 
eventual nullification of the military option not only from the side of the Arab states 
but also by the PLO, where the Palestinian National Council, which had its 
conference during the same year as the summit in Algiers, officially condemned and 
rejected terrorism in all its forms (Bickerton, Klausner, 1999: 234). Moreover, the 
Council determined the independence of Palestinian decision-making vis-á-vis the 
Arab regimes.
The years of 1988-1990 did not bring much positive results in the direction of the 
Arab-Israeli peace, though these years served as the prelude to the peace process that 
opened in 1991.
The years faced a lot of problems and issues on the agenda, many of which had been 
of an “Arab-Arab” conflict nature. The quest for regional order, dealing with the 
crises in Lebanon (which faced another civil war by the end of 1980s), Iran-Iraq war, 
the Palestinian uprising urged the states to convene numerous conferences; but the 
distinctive and typical feature of these summits was inability o f the states to come to 
common terms and positions, due to the divergent interests both internal and intra- 
regional with the economic factors also coming to play an important role. The 
significant feature of these summits was also to reassert and legitimate core actors’ 
alignments and interests, and in this context the Arab-Israeli conflict declined in its 
importance for the Arab states (except Syria, who throughout the years had as one of 
its aims to bring back the attention of other states, both frontline states and “sideline 
states” like Iran and Iraq, to the conflict in order to gain its support in its fight with 
Israel. Perhaps, Syria can be said the only state that never completely ruled out the 
military option, despite its official statements towards readiness for the finding the 
solution to the rivalries with Israel). After the Intifada and the Iraqi invasion of
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Kuwait the realization of the necessity o f a more active diplomatic process came to all 
the sides of the conflict, and it set in motion the process, which characterized the 
1990s until the outbreak of the second Intifada (or Al-Aqsa Intifada) in 2000.
The new circumstances in the world and in the region marked the new period in 
Arab-Israeli relations that brought the Israeli official peace with Jordan and lay down 
the foundations for the independent Palestinian state.
The collapse of the Soviet Union left the only Superpower having its influence in the 
region. The Superpower rivalry of the Cold War had enabled the Arab states by 
aligning themselves with the Soviet Union to arm themselves and maintain their 
opposition to Israel. With the disappearance of the traditional Arab ally, the balance 
of power in the region changed, accompanied also by the large influx (over 1 million 
people) o f the Soviet Jews; this was perceived as a threat by the Arab states, and 
especially by the Palestinian Arabs. This led to the reassessment by the Arab states of 
their relations with the West, and namely with the United States, which came to the 
fore during the American-led coalition in the 1990-1991 Gulf crisis.
The crisis changed the situation in the region. It again reasserted the centrality of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict and its link to the regional politics. Moreover, it showed still 
present division within the inter-Arab ranks, and the Arab economic and strategic 
considerations as central factors in their policy-making vis-á-vis the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. The Gulf families felt threatened by Iraq, and supported the Western-led 
coalition against the latter. King Hussein found himself, as in many previous 
situations tom between the sides, but eventually joined Saddam, for first he depended 
financially on Iraq, and second factor was that the Palestinian population in Jordan 
supported Saddam Hussein (it accounted for 60 per cent of his population) 
(Bickerton, Klausner, 1998: 250).
The distinctive feature of the course of the Gulf crisis was that for the first time in the 
annals of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Arab states found themselves on the same side 
of coalition with Israel. The crisis led to the split in the Arab world into those who 
supported Saddam, and those who opposed him (Schultz, 1999: 82). Egypt, Saudi 
Arabia, Syria, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Morocco, Oman, and the United Arabian 
Emirates supported the US-led coalition to oppose Saddam. Libya, Yemen, Sudan, 
Jordan and the PLO appeared on the other side (ibid: 83). The reason for Arabs’ 
joining into coalition was that they wanted to reverse the Iraqi aggression, to restore 
the political status quo and contain Iraq (Shlaim, 2004: 474).
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The fact that the Palestinians joined the anti-US-led coalition is explained by the Arab 
states’ inability and reluctance to address the issue of the Palestinian statehood. 
Hence, the Palestinians turned to the new “protector” of the Palestinian cause, 
Saddam Hussein, who during the Iraqi Revolutionary Council linked the invasion of 
Kuwait to the Palestinian question. Hussein suggested, that “Israel withdraw from the 
occupied territories in Palestine immediately and unconditionally, along with Syrian 
withdrawal from Lebanon and Iranian withdrawal from areas of Iraq. Only then 
would Iraq be willing to discuss the situation in Kuwait” (ibid: 83).
The link between the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Gulf crisis is seen as a byproduct 
of the ideologically driven difficulties shared by central Arab participants in the 
international anti-Iraq coalition (Sela, 1998: 302), and also the Palestinian’s 
contrasting the West’s prompt action (that is launching the Operation Desert Storm) 
over Kuwait with twenty-five years’ inaction over the occupied territories (Schultz, 
1999: 83).
However, in many analyses of the Gulf Crisis and its results, it is considered that 
Saddam Hussein failed to achieve the “linkage” between the two conflicts-Arab- 
Israeli and in the Gulf-for one consequence was the increased brutality of Israeli 
actions, and its new approach which ignored American, Arab and international 
opinion (Shlaim, 2004; Schultz, 1999).
As considered by the analysts, the Gulf Crisis did not bring significant change in the 
way of Arab thinking toward the Arab-Israeli conflict; however, it changed the 
balance-of-power in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Israel and Syria were relatively 
strengthened, while Jordan and the PLO weakened, and the need for resolving the 
Arab-Israeli conflict was an indispensable part of inter-Arab negotiations. During the 
summit in Baghdad, following the crisis, the states expressed the realistic 
pragmatism. Egyptian president, Hosni Mubarak, who succeeded Anwar Sadat after 
his assassination in 1981, “urged his colleagues to recognize the changes of the global 
order and called for cooperation, not confrontation, with the international community, 
and suggested that the Middle East be made a zone free of weapons of mass 
destruction” (Sela, 1998: 325).
Since the end of the October 1973 war till the culmination of the Gulf crisis, the Arab 
states’ actions were based on realistic considerations and the primacy of the state 
sovereignty over supra-national ideologies. The alignments in the latter crisis and the
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crises that shaped the region throughout the years were based on realistic 
considerations, which in its eventuality led the states to realize that the state of 
confrontation with Israel and the international world and particularly with the West 
damaged their own interests. Even though the states did not openly and unequivocally 
declare their genuine readiness to accept the legitimate right for Israel’s existence, 
with the process that started in the 1990s the state accepted the reality of political and 




Political Pragmatism: From Madrid Conference to the 
Second Intifada
The new decade of the 1990s represented the “new phase” in the Arab-Israeli conflict 
development. In the light of the circumstances that arouse in the arena of international 
relations and in the Middle East region, there appeared real and inevitable 
preconditions for the sides of the conflict to take up constructive efforts towards the 
long-needed settlement.
In the Arab perspective, the states now turned their policy-making into one that was 
based on well-calculated materialist considerations and away from the “zero-sum” 
approach and the belief that the gain of one party to a conflict automatically translates 
into the loss of the other party thus making compromise difficult (Schultz, 1999: 
136). This was also prompted by the disappearance of such an option from the world 
scene in general with the vanishing Superpower rivalry. This aspect represents an 
important factor in the states’ positions in the Arab-Israeli conflict and needs 
elaboration in order to understand the shift in the Arab states’ stances. Besides the 
inter-regional fights for the domination of the region and the quest to gain the 
overweighting part in the power balances in the area, many analysts attribute this to 
the reflection of the bi-polar world system, where the combination of forces in the 
Middle East often represented attachment to one of the rivaling sides, mostly 
depending financially on one of them. As Gad Barzilai and Gideon Doron in their 
article explain, in an attempt to connect the two conflicts and their relation, “regional 
instability in the Middle East was a function of the structural relationship between 
each superpower and the members of its regional coalition. When members of one 
coalition were in dispute with members of the other, the potential for the conflict 
increased greatly, because the communication between the antagonists from different 
coalitions was mostly indirect.” According to the authors, due to the separate agendas 
of the superpower parties, local disputes tended to be increased rather than 
suppressed. Like this, when the superpowers had been satisfied with the outcomes on 
the battlefield they were slow to intervene; or move the members of “their coalition”
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in the direction preferable for them and thus having the influence on the outcome. In 
most cases, the Superpowers encouraged the regional actors economically, hence 
directing the latter’s actions. With the disappearance of the Cold War rivalry and the 
strategic interest in the region not as high on the agenda, the sole influence of the 
United States on the direction of the Arab-Israeli conflict invested in the rethinking of 
choices between “war and peace” of the Arab states.
The Arab countries acquired new hope for addressing their structural economic 
problems, caused by the war in the Gulf, and in identifying a broker for promoting a 
negotiating peace with Israel (Barzilai, Doron, 1994). However as is noted, the 
aftermath of the Gulf War did not change much the internal political setting of the 
regional players. The rules and traditional modes of relation between the rulers and 
the ruled remained similar to those existing before the war, but the change occurred 
rather in the form of the transition from Arab dependency on two rival powers to 
dependency on a sole superpower with a demonstrated global reach (ibid). This was 
one of the factors that made the states consider participation in the international peace 
conference held in Madrid, in October 1991, which was eventually accepted by the 
Arab states as it presented the opportunity for the realization of their preferable 
approach to the conflict, that is, in the comprehensive manner. The acceptance of the 
conference is attributed to the perception of different parties of the conflict, and 
particularly the Arab states, of the United States as an honest broker, which, 
according to Barzilai and Doron, could not have happened in the earlier Cold War 
structure of polarization, when the Arab countries and Israel were subordinated to the 
status of proxies for the rival superpowers (ibid).
Even though the Madrid conference did not bring much result in the accommodation 
of the conflict, it indicated the readiness and the need of the Arab states for 
normalization of relations with Israel. It also pointed to the shift of the conflict away 
form ideology-based (even though declined already in the preceding years, but still 
arising at some points in time), to the economy-based, with the states’ realization of 
the need to be integrated to the spreading globalization and modernization of the 
international economic affairs, without abandoning, however, of the concept of 
“regional Arab order” (Sela, 1998: 332). The absence of the ideological factor and the 
total shift to the sovereign state, individual interests was reflected by the absence of 
the typical for the Arab decision-making practice of the summit meetings (indicative 
here is the fact that the Arab summits did not take place since the beginning of the
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1990s till 1996, the period of “active” peace process, only the summits dedicated to 
the economic issues) where the states hammered the collective decision toward Israel 
(ibid: 336). That Syria and Lebanon failed to create a collective decision-making 
forum particularly under Syrian supervision and inability by the latter to exercise its 
veto power in order to prevent the bi-lateral agreements, before the Madrid 
conference, attested to the obsolescence of the concept of collective Arab action in 
the Madrid peace process (ibid: 336).
The incompatibility of interests and mutual suspicion between the states, especially 
in the light of the nature of the coalitions during the Gulf War, allowed for the states 
to turn to individual actions and advance their long-waited goals, and for some states 
(Jordan) to conclude the official peace agreement with Israel, or establish the 
frameworks for future relations based on non-violence and low-level diplomatic 
relations. The situation also made it possible for the states to disregard the other Arab 
states’ opinion, previously at place based on the fear of being excluded, which the 
states could not have afforded due to internal non-stable political and economic 
situations. Now the states saw new opportunities in cooperation with Israel and 
availability of the American aid.
The principles on which the states agreed to base the regional order were reflected in 
the Damascus Declaration issued in March 1991, where it stated that the states 
“adhered to the principles of international legitimacy, particularly those relating to 
respecting states’ sovereignty, noninterference in domestic affairs, and settling 
conflict through peaceful means” (ibid: 332). This declaration officially was the proof 
of the fact that the Arab states officially declared to accept the legitimacy of the State 
of Israel pointing to the possibility of peace agreement. It also pointed to the 
pragmatism of the state’s thinking for the Declaration mentioned financial aid for 
Syria and Egypt (which now became the nucleolus of the peacekeeping force in the 
Gulf region) for their efforts. This position also aimed at the American support, like 
this gaining for the states additional financial assistance as an encouragement for the 
participation in the international conference, and advancing the peace efforts that 
followed. For example, when Jordan and Israel worked toward the signing of the 
peace agreement, congressional leaders agreed to speed up the relief of the 
approximately $700 million Jordanian debt by up to $220 million, with future relief 
dependent on progress toward a final peace agreement, support for the Arab 
economic boycott, and full compliance with international sanctions against Iraq
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(Bickerton, Klausner, 1998: 286). Moreover, this reflected the opportunism which the 
Arab states expressed in order to achieve their old claims. The window of 
opportunity, as noted by Schultz, is considered an important condition in the search 
for a lasting peace and stability, and many of the states managed not to miss it and to 
use it to their own advantage. In this context, Jordan can be said to have achieved its 
century long desire to conclude the peace treaty with Israel, which the two countries 
signed on October 26, 1994. That was a pragmatic move of King Hussein who was 
determined to be a player in the peace process and to consolidate and protect his own 
interests in the wake of the accord between the PLO and Israel, without waiting for 
similar progress in Israel’s dealing with Syria and other Arab countries. Besides, he 
was eager for American assistance in rebuilding the Jordanian economy devastated 
after the war in the Gulf (ibid: 285). By rapprochement with Israel, Jordanian King 
also made an attempt to raise his position after his participation in the coalition 
opposing the Israeli-led force against Saddam Hussein, which left the negative stamp 
on the state’s image. This shift in Jordanian foreign policy is explained by the coming 
of the new government in the country after the elections held in November 1993, the 
first multiparty election since 1957 (Shlaim, 2004: 539). The election resulted in the 
government without the Islamic representatives, whose main platform was an 
opposition to the peace talks with Israel; and the strengthened conservative, tribal, 
and independent blocs (ibid: 539). Jordan’s interest was motivated by practical 
reasons, both economic and political. Moreover, the regime faced the huge waves of 
Palestinian immigrants from the Gulf, as the result of their exclusion after the support 
of Saddam in the Gulf war (Sela, 1998: 335). According to Sela, the shift in the 
King’s policy also represented the regime’s traditional alliance with the West and its 
persistent effort since 1967 to advance a diplomatic settlement of the conflict with 
Israel.
The agreement was induced by other factors, which relates to the conclusion by the 
PLO and Israel of the Oslo Accords in September 1993 (see Appendix 9), which was 
the result of the secret diplomacy between the representatives of the PLO and the 
Israeli government and the breakthrough in the Israeli-Palestinian relations, which 
had been perceived by Jordan and Syria as the undermining of their own influence on 
the PLO and on the general going of the Arab-Israeli conflict (though the Syrian 
position did not appear as conciliatory as that of Jordan, due to the still present 
ambitions to dominate the region and have the last say in the final negotiations, and
75
unlike Jordan, this state had serious territorial claims). These accords are considered 
to be the historical opportunity for the sides o f the conflict in coming to the final 
solution of their century-long rivalry.
From the Arab perspective, the accord was perceived with the mixed reactions. 
Obviously enough, the accord was met with criticism by Syria, though it did not 
condemn it. The Syrians criticized the PLO for recognizing Israel, for making a 
separate agreement and far-reaching concessions (Sela, 1998: 337). But the 
significant outcome was that Syria appeared to have lost its strong influence on the 
Israeli-Palestinian peace process, proved by the fact that it abstained to use force 
against Palestinian targets in Lebanon (ibid: 337).
The most important impact of the accord, however, was that it broke the taboo of the 
Israeli-Palestinian relations, which served as an important landmark along the road to 
Arab recognition of Israel and the normalization of relations with it (Shlaim, 2004: 
520). Since the conflict now was based on the Palestinian dimension as its core, the 
Arab states needed to rethink their relation to the entity and the State of Israel facing 
the enhanced ability of the Palestinians to promote their rights and cause on their 
own.
No less role was played by Egypt, who was the first state to recognize Israel, and it 
had experienced precedent for such breakthrough. For Egypt any advancement of an 
Arab-Israeli settlement was seen as reinforcement of its legitimacy and leadership in 
the Arab world, and the reward economically by the United States (Sela, 1998: 333). 
Another state that also played the decisive role in changing of the radical states’ 
attitude to the conflict and the means for its resolution was Saudi Arabia, who became 
close in relations with the United States after the Gulf War, following its particular 
interests (ibid: 334), that is another indication of consolidation of the “state-first” 
approaches of the states.
The Oslo Accords, Jordanian-Israeli peace, and the development of Israeli relations 
with the other countries in the Middle East put Syria to the sidelines and the 
incompatible position with its leader’s Hafez al-Asad career to place Syria at the heart 
of the Arab-Israeli conflict. He managed to gain such role for his country by the 
beginning of the 1990s, which had been made possible by Syria’s military 
capabilities, which made this economically and politically weak country into a 
regional power (Schultz, 1999: 88). Therefore Asad had been reluctant to engage in 
any substantive peace negotiations with Israel, in order not to lose the position.
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In the theory of conflict resolution, the mention o f ‘fear’ factor is made, which points 
to the halting aspect towards any conflict or dispute resolution. This and also still 
present ideological factor can be applied in explaining Syria’s reluctant negotiating 
strategy. In this context, the fear is related to the Syrian fear o f marginalization (ibid: 
89), and the centrality of position it took in the region. The figure of Hafez al-Asad 
and his strategic thinking played important role in the Arab-Israeli conflict. He called 
for the Arab strife to master sufficient deterrent power to hold Israel in check 
(Shlaim, 2004: 531). Failing that, they would have no choice but to submit to its 
dictates. He saw the only possibility in maintaining of “strategic parity” with Israel 
(his main concept) in the comprehensive settlement, which would stop the “Israeli 
encroachment and prevent Israel form picking off the weaker Arab parties one by 
one” (ibid: 531).
Thus he insisted on the Israeli undertaking to return the Golan Heights first and 
foremost before any guarantees for peace agreement, and based his formula on the 
principle of “full withdrawal for full peace” (that is the Israeli withdrawal to the 
armistice lines of 4 June 1967, and the solution based on UN resolutions). The only 
reason for expressed concessions was the economic factor as the aim of extracting the 
American aid. Besides strong territorial reservations, the Syrians were afraid to 
expose their economy and nascent industries to Israeli penetration when their per 
capita income was $900 per annum while that of the Israelis was $15000 per annum 
(ibid: 535), and this is in the light of the Syrian much higher prevalence in the 
population.
Syrian categorical stance made it impossible for Lebanon to stand on the road to 
peace negotiations with Lebanon, for the former had strong presence and influence in 
the country.
Syria was able to use its leverage in the South Lebanon where the activities of 
extremist Hizbullah was of concern for both Syria and Israel, and both countries were 
able to use the destabilized situation in the area for their own political reasons 
(Schultz, 1999: 89). As is explained by Schultz (1999), Lebanon could benefit greatly 
from peace in the region, for since the end of the 15-year civil war, Beirut has been 
slowly re-emerging as a financial and business center. Normalization of relations with 
Israel would position Lebanon at the heart of the Middle Eastern banking, business, 
service and computing sectors, along with Israel and Jordan (ibid: 89). In the 
literature, this country is referred to as the “Switzerland of the Middle East” due to its
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position and inherent “neutrality” politics. But such prospect for the country was 
bound to non-realization given the Syrian factor with its ambitious “greater Syria” 
rhetoric and obsession with the security considerations, and Lebanon considered as 
indispensable part of it.
The way in which the Arab states acted in response to the peace process that started in 
the first half o f the 1990s can be explained as the strategic and pragmatic choice 
rather than genuine readiness to accept Israel as equal partner and legitimate actor in 
the regional world order that the states constantly set on trying to construct and 
define. Rather than genuinely facilitate the Palestinian cause the Arab states turned 
into direction of extracting the advantageous deals for themselves, keeping the issue 
of the Palestinian state on a highly nominal level, and as the leverage to be eligible to 
any financial deals that related to the conflict.
In the midst of the peace process deterioration during the mid-1990s, after the 
assassination of the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, and coming to power of the 
hard-liner Netanyahu much opposed to the Oslo Accords, the states did not change 
much in the essence of their stances, remaining determined to their previous official 
statements concerning the conflict. The states expressed their grievances and 
disapproval towards the Netanyahu government policies (note 2) describing them as 
“destroying the foundation for peace” (Damascus newspaper, quoted in Shlaim, 2004: 
572); or as Saudi-owned newspaper Al-Hayat said: “his [Netanyahu] program was a 
recipe for wrecking the peace process” (ibid). The reactions of the Arab states were 
expressed in the first highly-attended summit o f the Arab League since the 1990, 
where the Arab states aimed at restoring the Arab cohesion and sending the message 
to Israel that the peace process would be halted and there would be no normalization 
of relations until Israel reverted to the principle of land for peace (ibid: 573). Whereas 
they made the sharp statements, this summit did not conclude in any novelty o f the 
Arab position in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and once again proved the fact that they 
would not change their positions unless Israel withdraws from the territories and the 
question of the Palestinian statehood be addressed in a constructive way. The final 
communiqué of the summit stated that the heads of states reiterated that a just and 
comprehensive peace remained their strategic choice (ibid), and proving their 
political pragmatism. The states did not make any statements concerning their 
probable actions in case of Israeli non-compliance, like this taking the “wait-and-see” 
position vis-á-vis Israel, that has been the characteristic feature of the Arab states
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standing in the conflict up until the 2000 (the time of the second Intifada, aggravated 
by the impasse in the peace process and provocative action of Ariel Sharon (note 3) 
when the states issued another joint statement on their positions, however not 
depicting many crucial changes.
The second half of the 1990s, was characterized by another regional debate, the 
feature that can be said as typical for the Arab policy-making to take up when the 
impasse in relation with Israel, or turning point in the conflict took place.
The Middle Eastern countries faced the rising threats of the radical regimes, which 
started to attract growing attention in the light of their growing significance and 
spread. In the economic field the trend was of growing dependency of the Arab states 
on food imports, hence on foreign aid, leading to national debt. In 1996 the new 
Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres mentioned the concept of the “New Middle 
East”, which was aimed at the new order of economic relations in the region and 
rethinking of the regional order in general. The Arab states, though expressing 
cautious reactions out of fear of the possible Israeli domination now not only military 
but also economic, set on the debate too. The two summits were held in Casablanca 
and Amman, where the debate revealed the strong need for the revival o f the Arab 
regional system based on cooperation and mutual interests of security and economic 
development (Sela, 1998: 339). With this approach the Israeli idea of 
“Mideasternism” was perceived along the dividing lines among the Arab states. Syria, 
fateful to its hard-line stance, saw the new rhetoric as a “cloak for Israel’s ambition to 
dominate the Levant (note 4).
The Egyptians suspected that Israel wanted to take over their traditional role of 
principal leadership in the Middle East” (Shlaim, 2004: 553). This debate pointed to 
the fact that the Arab stance in the Arab-Israeli conflict shifted from the core military 
confrontation to the economic one, and the resolution or possible settlement included 
not only the security issues but also the strategic economic relations. The shift 
represents the traditional divide in the inter-Arab politics. The opposition groups 
tended to highlight the danger to Arab and Islamic identity in the region that the 
peace process with Israel entailed (Sela, 1998: 340). On the official level, Israel’s 
acceptance served as an incentive for those Arab states interested in weakening the 
burden of collective Arab instruments and commitments and fully exercise their 
sovereignty. The conservative line of thought, both in inter-Arab area and intra-Arab 
realm, expressed the cautiousness in that the Arab regimes aimed at establishing the
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economic and diplomatic relations with Israel in disregard of crucial unresolved 
Arab-Israeli issues (ibid: 339).
The debate took the Arab attention to the Palestinian question away from the center of 
their concern. Since the signature of the Oslo Accords in 1993, despite the official 
Arab backing of Arafat and the principle of land for peace and the Palestinian state, 
the level of actual support for the Palestinian Authority had been remarkably low. The 
Arab states showed little effort in aiding the Palestinian Authority to overcome the 
deadlocks in the Palestinian negotiations with Israel, and toughened Israeli 
negotiating position (Rubin, 1998). The non-compatibility of Arab action and rhetoric 
on the Palestinian question mentioned by Miller (1986) is clearly visible in these 
points.
As considered by many analysts, even though the Arab states declared their support 
for the Palestinian state, and maintained the readiness for the peaceful coexistence 
with the State of Israel, the lack of real actions could not bring substantial results in 
the positive development. This lack of action is expressed in both real attempts of the 
Arab states to work out the comprehensive and structural working principles to 
negotiate with Israel on the issues of concern for their own countries; and the lack of 
“normal” material support for the Palestinian Authority to promote the Palestinian 
nation-state. Such help could strengthen Arafat’s bargaining positions and ameliorate 
tenuous living conditions in the PA territory and consolidate Arafat’s rule, necessary 
to oppose the radical fractions in the Palestinian territories, often operating with the 
support of the radical Arab states, aimed at halting the peace process.
In general view, the Arab states in the 1990s (except Syria and Iraq) did not pursue 
aggressive political policies against Israel. Rubin points to this trend by mentioning 
the Arab League resolutions concerning the conflict, and says that the “unstated goals 
of [Arab] states vis-á-vis Israel were more moderate and pragmatic in historical terms 
than ever before: that is, Israel could not realistically be destroyed, it should be 
compelled to accept a compromise peace” (Rubin, 1998).
The dire situation in the Palestinian territories, lack of political strength and support 
internally and externally, and the deterioration of the progress in negotiations with 
Israel led to the eruption of Al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000, that again brought the 
Palestinian issue to the core of the Arab concern, however, unlike the Intifada of 1987 
it did not bring the crucial turning points in the developments of the conflict or the 
radical shifts in the stances of the Arab states. The Arab response was expressed in
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the Emergency Arab Summit Conference in Cairo in 2000, the final statement of 
which ruled out any military solution to the conflict and emphasized the need for 
peaceful resolution of the conflict, and the reiteration that the Arab leaders committed 
to a “just and comprehensive peace” based on UN resolutions. The Arab response to 
Intifada was rather passive and brought the issue of public opinion to be an important 
part in defining the Arab positions towards the conflict. This aspect showed the 
importance of the Arab-Israeli conflict for the internal situations and the viabilities of 
Arab regimes. In the light of the public dissatisfaction with Israeli policies and 
passivity of their leaders in response to the Palestinian failures, the leaders had to 
adopt to these circumstances, in trying to balance between the official accepting the 
possibility of making peace with Israel, and domestically giving the statements that 
condemned that state and promising to undertake the concrete action against Israel; 
the latter option, however, is denied by many policy-makers and analysts as 
unpractical and unlikely to end in a realistic outcome.
In 2001, the ruler of Saudi Arabia Prince Abdullah proposed a peace initiative, which 
suggested the “full normalization of relations between the Arab world and Israel, in 
return for full withdrawal to Israel’s June 4, 1967 borders” (Aluff Benn, 2002). The 
initiative was accepted by most of the Arab states and made the ground for the “Arab 
Peace Initiative” which clearly stated the states readiness for accepting the state of 
Israel as a legitimate actor and partner in the region and proved the final stance of the 
Arab states on the comprehensive “peace for land” principle as the precondition. The 
Arab Peace Initiative was adopted at Beirut Summit in 2002, based on Saudi Plan, 
reflected the shift of the Arab position from “normalization” of relations to “peace 
agreement with Israel, and provide security for all the states of the region” (see 
Appendix 10). There are deliberations in the discussions on the summit concerning 
whether the states sincerely adopted the position based on the “sincere” Saudi 
proposal, or they just needed to raise their image on the world arena. The initiative is 
considered to be highly unacceptable by Israel (and it did not accept it) and the fact 
that the Arab states accepted it is related firstly to the fact that they had no other 
option at the time, and secondly, in order to diminish Israel’s posture as trying to 
present it as uninterested in peace. Irregardless of the real reason, of interest is the 
official public recognition of Israel by most of the Arab states, and even the radicals 
including Syria.
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If one thinks in terms of scales with ideology on one side and pragmatism on the 
other, the Arab states stances definitely scaled down to the latter’s side. Away from 
the collective rhetoric of resistance of the State of Israel the states now acted based on 
the intra-state political context, with the highly improbable military option which 
confronts the principles o f global economy impossible for disregarding by the Arab 
states. Even though it is difficult to characterize the relations between the Arab states 
and the State of Israel by the end of the century as normal and mutually-productive, 
the positive dynamics since the end of the war of 1967 is definitely present, and the 
future development depends a lot on the commitments of the both parties to work out 
solutions, and follow the stated principles.
The “extremists” factor came as has been mentioned to play crucial role in the Arab- 
Israeli relations, which the states are confronted with and cannot disregard in forming 
their official positions.
From the 1990s perspective, the Arab states had come to recognizing that Israel was 
there to stay and moved to peace, even though reluctantly in many cases (Morris, 
1999: 667). Even though many Arabs might be oriented on the destruction of Israel, 




The Middle Eastern past century history witnessed complex, multi-vectoral Arab- 
Israeli relations characterized by mutual hostility, worrisome attitudes, and attempts 
to come to terms with each other, which have been both successful and doubtful. The 
Arab states’ attitudes, of interest in this writing, are reflected in active dynamics of 
their stances vis-á-vis Israel, which culminated in the termination of the “classical” 
rejection of the latter and taking up of the “wait-and-see” non-military position.
As is seen in the historical development of their standpoints in the Arab-Israeli 
conflict this dynamics was influenced by various factors inherent in no little degree in 
the inter-Arab relations and politics. From the 1950s and early 1960s ideological 
rigidity and symbolism, the states transformed their thinking into one based on realist 
accounts of circumstances, pragmatic development of means of reaching their state 
interests that appeared to be the paramount concern of the state regimes, and return to 
the Westphalian regional order, with the prevalence of state sovereignty, and the 
principle of raison de la nation.
The analysis of the Arab-Israeli relations showed strong connection of two processes 
taking place in the region and their mutual influence and dependence. These 
processes represent the historical development of states and the rivalry with the State 
of Israel. This very connection was the force that mobilized these processes.
In the first half of the 19th century the states of the Fertile Crescent had been engaged 
into definition of their meaning as state entities and attempts to understand their role 
as regional players. Such efforts had been built on the symbolic meaning of events 
interpreted within the habitual Arab-Muslim society’s tradition, hence the conflict 
with Israel and precisely Palestinian conflict constituted the centripetal role in Arab 
discourses. The symbolic meaning of the conflict with Israel served the Arab rulers as
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a means to lend credence to the regional status quo and legitimize traditional attitudes 
on question of Arab normative significance.
The Palestinian cause thus was seen and presented by the Arab regimes as the point 
of common concern and the unifying force within the pan-Arab rhetoric. Regional 
Arab politics represented a constant tension between the status quo order and claims 
for its revision, often serving an egoistic quest for recognition and power (Sela, 1998: 
342).
In this environment the Palestine conflict became the most powerful rallying issue in 
regional Arab politics, which attracted the growing involvement of Arab politics both 
in the context of state-society conflict and inter-Arab competition for regional 
leadership (ibid: 342). This conflict served as a theme for revolutionary slogans 
during the pan-Arab Nasserist era of the 1950s and early 1960s, and was used in 
ideological campaigns.
The PLO served the Arab states as factor that contained the nationalist criticism and 
legitimized Arab states’ diplomatic efforts to recover their own territories (ibid: 345). 
The territories had been given the highest priority by the states and institutionalization 
of the PLO and making of the Palestinian cause a necessary demand in any 
negotiations was a strategic move of the Arab states in gaining of their interests. 
Starting from the late 1970s the Arab support of the Palestinian cause became rather 
declarative, and connected to the states’ fear o f its uprising spillover to their countries 
with this damaging their ruling elites’ authority and political stability in countries. 
This trend is seen in limited financial support for the Palestinians and low action in 
promoting the independent Palestinian state, provided only verbally and on the 
rhetorical level.
The period under concern of this dissertation- 1967 till the end of the 1990s- reflects 
clearly the dynamics of the positions taken by the Arab states in the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. These dynamics can be characterized as going in the positive direction in the 
frontline states development of readiness to accept the legitimacy of the State of 
Israel and hence the settlement of the conflict. This readiness is manifested by the 
actual attempts of the states to work out the workable solutions even under the 
constraint of the elements unacceptable by either of the parties, and by the changed 
nature of the overall Arab-Israeli conflict, that is from the armed confrontation to 
“pragmatic peace.” Here the peace cannot be characterized by the essential meaning
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of the word but it allows for the probable perspective of future cooperation of the 
Arab states and Israel in that direction.
The present situation presents with the fact that the conflict acquired the circular 
nature, meaning that the possible resolution of it would be the one proposed in 1947 
UN Resolution aimed at the partition of Western Palestine to be shared for 
establishing of the Jewish and Palestinian states (Bickerton, Klausner, 1998: 317). 
The difference is that back in the early years of the conflict the Palestinian Arabs and 
the neighboring Arab states rejected this decision, and having gone through the 
complex periods of time, and having reiterated many of the other options, in the 21st 
century this remains the most viable and realistic decision, accepted by Arab 
counterparts.
The periods of time described here reflect the factors influencing the dynamics of 
Arab perception of Israel, which had been formulated and had resulted in what they 
are now under the flow of events accompanying those periods.
From vehement rejection of Israel by the Arab states after 1967 war and ideological 
rigidity present in their attitudes, the latter transformed in to the more realistic and 
“sober” treatment of the Jewish neighbor, which eventually concluded in the 
pragmatic vision based on the questions o f economy and national interests implying 
the degree of flexibility by the states in order to reach the positive outcomes in those 
directions.
This direction in the change of the Arab states’ positions in the Arab-Israeli conflict is 
strongly connected to the matter of the search for the regional order by the Arab states 
and the bases for mutual relations. From the attachment to the common cause 
exercised on the platform of the Arab League summits, which played a crucial role in 
formulation by the states of their positions toward Israel, the states developed the sub­
regional systems of decision-making. This feature coincides with the states’ lessening 
of the degree of attention paid to the Arab-Israeli conflict, hence indicating the taking 
of the less confrontationist stance vis-á-vis Israel.
The Arab summits served as the decision-making forum for the states, the basis for 
choosing between sovereign or collective actions in regard to the conflict with Israel, 
and as effective diminishing factor for prospects of a total Arab war against Israel 
(Sela, 1998: 344).
Even though this institute did not cease its existence, with time it started to represent 
rather a mechanism for legitimating the diplomatic process started in the mid-1970s
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and which reached its pick in the mid-1990s. This is explained by the growing control 
of the domestic political arena by the states, and the decline of the impact of supra- 
state symbols on Arab societal behavior (ibid: 343). The consequence of this change 
in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict is that the states enhanced autonomous 
foreign policies vis-á-vis the State of Israel, which resulted in the “routinization” of 
the conflict (ibid: 343) and opening of the channels for political process that led to the 
peace agreements of some of the Arab states with Israel (Egypt and Jordan up to day) 
and establishing of low-level diplomatic relations with other.
That the states opted for the accepting of Israel as an equal player in the region and its 
recogntion, even if not genuinely in many cases but based on calculated interests, is 
also attributed to the eventual consolidation of the sovereign states system in the 
region which allowed for the states to make independent decisions in most cases 
positive for the Arab-Israeli conflict resolution. The rules of their political behavior 
started to be defined on reality and inter-state situations, while the common supra­
national interests served for the states rather as a burden. This is reflected in the Arab 
attitudes toward war in Lebanon, Intifada with the low Arab response.
The economic issues and change in the global international relations stand as another 
factor that influenced the shift of the Arab states’ positions toward recognition of 
Israel. The states realized that with peace, international investment, both private and 
governmental, will flow into the area and be beneficial to the countries in the area 
(Bickerton, Klausner, 198: 319).
Thus, the dynamics of the Arab states’ positions in the Arab-Israeli conflict can be 
summarized as the course that shifted from one marked by coercion and militant 
ideologies o f the post-1967 Six Day war era to one marked by realism and 
pragmatism. The loss of territories in this war defined the states’ stances in terms of 
zero-sum approach and the quest for the determination of Israel as the factor not 
compatible with the Arab-Islamic tradition and as an undesirable, alien entity in the 
region. However, the 1973 October War turned the attitudes of the Arab states away 
from the ethno-religious total conflict over Israel’s legitimacy into one over national 
territory and boundaries. The oil power, and growing consequential international and 
regional influence of the Gulf monarchies gave rise to a new social and economic 
sub-system marked by pragmatic, business-like norms in handling Arab regional 
relations (Sela, 1998: 346), and hence relations with Israel.
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In the light of the 1980s geographic fragmentation, threats from non-Arab actors 
(namely Iran), economic constraints moved the conflict with Israel to a lower priority 
on the Arab collective agenda. This is seen by the absence of the theme in the Arab 
summits of the 1980s.
The gulf war of 1990-1991 brought back the importance of the Arab-Israeli conflict 
for the states; however, it took up a different shape, the one of the need of finding the 
ways for its solution rather than means to achieve the zero-sum outcomes. The post- 
Oslo period is characterized by the analysts (e.g. Sela, 1998; Shlaim, 2004; Bickerton 
and Klausner, 1998) as the culmination of the “classical” Arab-Israeli conflict 
including the issues like broad Arab strategic quests for regional domination and 
high-probability military actions in inter-states rivalries. The period is said to be the 
one where the conflict is routinized (ibid) with the major concern on the Palestinian 
statehood, as the core of the conflict.
The problems posed amidst the Arab-Israeli relations can stem rather from the radical 
contingent of the states, the most vivid of which still remains Syria, and the extremist 
groupings and fractions both within the territories of the frontline states, the 
Palestinian Authority, and other Arab states with strong Islamic identities. The rise of 
Islamic fundamentalism in the past years became the matter of concern of both 
regional and international actors, and can be the factor that will move aside yet again 
the salience of the Arab-Israeli “traditional” conflict in. The rise of the radicalism of 
the non-Arab regional actors, namely Iran, can also be related to the category of 
issues that would draw the attention of the parties o f the conflict away from Arab- 
Israeli rivalries.
Even though the anti-Israeli rhetoric is used by the Arab leaders in their own states’ 
realms directed at satisfying the public opinion, that came to play important role in 
the late 1990s and at present, the real actions are mostly improbable to go in accord 
with such rhetoric. This would be unacceptable both for moderate states who would 
not give up their developmentalist policies as that would harm their economies 
already weak in the light of the high population growth and volatile oil prices; and the 
radicals whose actual power falls short of their ambitions (Rubin, 1998).
Among these radical states Syria represents the halting point in the furthering of 
peace achievements in the real terms, the state that still takes up the position of 
insisting on Israel’s return of their land, despite the succession of the Syrian president 
Hafez Al-Asad by his son Bashir Asad, who is considered to be a more moderate and
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pro-Western figure. The inflexibility of Syria and its “strategic parity” principle and 
the dominating role in Lebanon (even after its withdrawal from the country in 2004), 
will make it improbable for the Lebanese peace with Israel, for the country has strong 
influence in Lebanon. So far, the peace process between Syria and Israel has been 
frozen.
As is noted by Adel Darwish in The Middle East, “Syria under Hafez Al-Asad had no 
wish for normal relations with Israel, and was prepared to postpone getting back 
his land order to continue to lead the anti-Israeli anti-compromise front.” But despite 
the debate in the Arab countries, that they are not in favor of “normalized” relations 
with Israel, the Arab states would search to make a deal with Israel in order to regain 
the occupied land for they cannot achieve it by force, which rules out any military 
option.
Besides, the region experienced the coming to power in the state regimes of the more 
pro-Western rulers, for instance in 2000 King Hussein of Jordan had been succeeded 
by his son King Abdullah; Morocco, and Syria also had similar changes in monarchs 
thus the countries are governed in a less autocratic and more pro-Western styles 
(Andrew Album in The Middle East) which brings more hopes for Arab-Israeli 
rapprochement.
In 2006 the Arab states held the summit at Khartoum which was compared to the one 
held at the same place forty years ago that resulted in “Three No’s”; however, this 
one showed itself as the reversal of positions of the Arab states. As Hassan Nafaa in 
Al-Ahram commented, “the reason for change of heart is that the Arabs have lacked 
the resort needed to support their continued snubbing of Israel’s pleas or, later, to lure 
Israel and its supporters way from their aloofness in the face of Arabs’ new-found 
supplication.”
Under the present circumstances the states affirm the peace settlement in accordance 
with Beirut initiative, based on the comprehensive approach. For Israel such approach 
is not satisfactory but the states do not have any other option, and unlike in the post- 
1967 era they do not have strong regional leadership. Egypt (traditional pivotal state) 
was absent from the 2006 Summit; they lack the collective will to challenge Israel; 
the leaders have weaker stances in their own countries. Therefore, yet again, the states 
face the degrading regional order, which again represents the precondition for their 
future dealing with the conflict with Israel and other regional conflict present at the 
time, and as Nafaa suggests, in order to achieve real improvement in relations with
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Israel, the states should find a “collective and rational management of the conflict 
with Israel, in addition to the carefully-planned channeling and deployment of Arab 
resources. Only then can the Arab countries effectively and rapidly push for a just 




1. A vi Shlaim. The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World. Penguin Books, London,
2000.
2. Albert Houráni. A History of the Arab Peoples. Faber and Faber, London, 2002.
3. Bernard Lewis. From Babel to Dragomans: Interpreting the Middle East.
Phoenix, London, 2005.
4. David Lea. A Survey of Arab-Israeli Relations 1947-2001. London: Europa,
2002.
5. The Foreign Policies of the Middle Eastern States. / edited by Raymond
Hinnebusch, Anoushiravan Ehteshamir, Boulder, Reinner, 2001.
6. Louise Fawcett. International Relations of the Middle East. Oxford: Oxford
University, 2005.
7. Avi Kober. Coalition Defection: The Dissolution of the Arab Anti- Israeli
Coalition War and Peace. Praeger, USA, 2002. [Questia]
8. Benny Morris. Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-
1999 London, 1999.
9. Maja Zehfuss. Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality.
Princeton, 2003.
10. Mark Kauppi, Paul R. Viotti. International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism,
Globalism and Beyond. Boston, 1999.
11. Alvi Z Rubinstein. The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Perspectives. New York, Harper
Collins 1999.
12. Aaron D. Miller. The Arab States and the Palestine Question: Between Ideology
and Self-Interest. Praeger, New York, London, 1986.
13. “The Gulf Crisis and Its Global Aftermath.” Edited by Gad Barzilai, Ahron
Klieman, Gil Shidlo.London, New York, 1994. Here chapter by Gad 
Barzilai and Gideon Doron “Conflict Resolution Under the Veil of 
Uncertainty: the Middle East.” [P. 279]
14. Ann M. Lesch, Dan Tschigri. Origins and Development of the Arab Israeli
Conflict. Greenwood Press, 1998. [Questia]
15. M ichaelN. Barnett. Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order.
90
Columbia University Press, 1998. [Ciaonet]
16. Avraham Sela. The Decline o f the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Middle East Politics and
the Quest for Regional Order. State University of New York Press,
New York, 1998.
17. Kirsten E. Schultz. The Arab-Israeli Conflict. Longman. London, New York,
1999.
18. Ian J. Bickerton, Carla L. Klausner. A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli
Conflict. Prentice Hall. New Jersey, 1998.
19. Mehran Kamrava. The Modern Middle East: A Political History Since the First
World War. University of California Press. Berkley, Los Angeles, 
London, 2005.
20. Robert. O. Freedman. World Politics and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Pergamon
Press, 1979. [Questia]
21. Antonio Rubbi. Palestinsky Maraphon. Mezhdunarodnie Otnoshenia. Moskva,
2001 (translation form Italian. “Con Arafat in Palestina”)
22. Naomi Joy Weinberger. Syrian Intervention in Lebanon: the 1975-1976 Civil
War. Oxford University Press, 1986. [Questia]
23. P. Edward Haley, Lewis W. Snider. Lebanon in Crisis: Participants and Issues.
Syracuse University Press, 1979.
24. Gala El-Rashidi. The Arabs and the World of the Seventies. Vikas Publishing
House, 1977.
25. “Toward Arab-Israeli Peace: Report of a Study Group.” Washington, Brookings
Institution, 1988.
26. Thomas C. Schelling. The Strategy of Conflict. Harvard University, Cambridge,
Massachussets, London, England, 1997.
27. Wayne C. McWilliams and Harry Piotrowsky. The World Since 1945: A History
of International Relations. Boulder. London, 2001.
28. “State Strength, Permeability, and Foreign Policy Behavior: Jordan in
Theoretical Perspective,” by Bassel F. Salloukh in Arab Studies 
Quarterly, Vol. 18, 1996. [Questia]
Online Articles; Periodicals:
29. Noam Cnomsky. Perspective on the Palestinian-Israeli issue. Palestine-Israel,
91
USA, Politics, 12/26/2005
30. Osama El-Ghazali Harb. “After Peace There’s Still a Chance.”
Al-Ahram Weekly, 14-20 September, 2000, issue no. 499
31. Hassan Nafaa. “Comatose in Khartoum.” Al-Ahram Weekly, 6-12 April, 2006, 
issue no. 789
32. The Middle East in Crisis. A Council on Foreign Relations Book, Foreign 
Affairs, New York, 2002. Article by Aluf Benn, “The Last of the Patriarchs” 
[pp.35-50],
33. Middle East Quarterly [here: "Is the Arab-Israeli Conflict Over?” by Barry 
Rubin. Volume III: number 3, September 1996]
34. Washington Institute for Middle Eastern Studies. “Arab State Support to the 
Palestiian Authority: Unfulfilled Expectations”, by Barry Rubin, October 6, 1998 
[at: http://washingtoninstitute.org/print.php].
35. “Israel, the Palestinian Authority, and the Arab States” by Barry Rubin.
Mideast Security and Policy Studies, No. 36, January 1998.
[At: http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/books/36pub.ht.ml]
36. Daniel Pipes. Wall Street Journal Europe. December 3, 2002. “Arabs Have 
Never Accepted Israel.” [At: http://danielpipes.org/pf.php?id=88]
37. Daniel Pipes. Washington Times. March 16, 1994. “The End of the Reign of 
Optimism in the Middle East.” [At: http://danielpipes.org/pf?id=291]
38. Brent E. Sasly. “The Role of the Arab-Israeli Conflict in Arab Domestic Policy: 
Using International Relations for Internal Consumption.” McGill, 2002
[brent. sasley @mail. mcgill. ca]
39. Mark A. Heller. Tel Aviv Notes. November 23, 2003. “The Arab World and the 
‘Al-Aqsa Intifada.” [At: http://www.tav.ac.il/icss/; http://www.dayan.org],
40. Dan Tschirgi, Lynner Rienner. The Arab World Today. Boulder, 1994. [Questia]
41. The Middle East. February 2000. “Countdown to Peace?” by Adel Darwish.
Here also: “Towards a Final Agreement” by Andrew Album.
42. The Middle East. December 2000. “Piecing the Peace”







*In order o f  appearance in the text
93
Appendix 1
Decision o f 19 June read:
“Israel proposes the conclusion of a peace agreement with Egypt based on the 
international border and the security needs of Israel.”
The international border placed the Gaza Strip within Israel’s territory. Israel’s 
conditions for peace were: (1) guarantee of freedom of navigation in the Straits of 
Tiran and the Gulf o f Aqaba; (2) guarantee of freedom of navigation in the Suez 
Canal; (3) guarantee of overflight rights in the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba; 
(4) the demilitarization of the Sinai peninsula.
The decision proposed the conclusion of a peace treaty with Syria, based on 
international border and the security needs of Israel. The conditions for peace were:
(1) demilitarization of the Golan Heights and (2) absolute guarantee of noninterference 
with the flow of water from the river Jordan to Israel.
Source: Shlaim, 2004: 253
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United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 22 November 1967
Following the Six Day War, the United Nations Security Council adopted a British- 
sponsored resolution aimed at solving the Arab-Israeli conflict.
The Security Council,
Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East, the need 
to work for a just lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security, 
Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the 
United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of 
the Charter,
1. Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a 
just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both 
the following principles:
2. 1 .(i) Withdrawal of Israeli arm forces from territories occupied in the recent 
conflict; (ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and 
acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of 
every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized 
boundaries free from threats or acts of force; 2. Affirms further the necessity (a) For 
guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area; (c) 
For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State 
in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones; 3. 
Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to establish and 
maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist 
efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions 
and principles in this resolution; 4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the 
Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as 
possible.
Appendix 2
Source: Schultz, 1999: 10
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Appendix 3 
Khartoum Resolutions 1 September 1967
Following the Six Day War, the Arab states established the framework for policy vis- 
a-vis Israel, the Conflict, and the territories occupied by Israel during the war.
TEXT:
1. The conference has affirmed the unity o f Arab ranks, the unity o f joint action and the need for 
coordination and for the elimination o f all differences. The Kings, Presidents and representatives 
of the other Arab Heads o f State at the conference have affirmed their countries' stand by and 
implementation o f the Arab Solidarity Charter which was signed at the third Arab summit 
conference in Casablanca.
2. The conference has agreed on the need to consolidate all efforts to eliminate the effects o f the 
aggression on the basis that the occupied lands are Arab lands and that the burden o f regaining 
these lands falls on all the Arab States.
3. The Arab Heads o f State have agreed to unite their political efforts at the international and 
diplomatic level to eliminate the effects o f the aggression and to ensure the withdrawal of the 
aggressive Israeli forces from the Arab lands which have been occupied since the aggression of 
June 5. This will be done within the framework of the main principles by which the Arab States 
abide, namely, no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with it, and insistence 
on the rights of the Palestinian people in their own country.
4. The conference o f Arab Ministers o f Finance, Economy and Oil recommended that suspension 
of oil pumping be used as a weapon in the battle. However, after thoroughly studying the matter, 
the summit conference has come to the conclusion that the oil pumping can itself be used as a 
positive weapon, since oil is an Arab resource which can be used to strengthen the economy o f the 
Arab States directly affected by the aggression, so that these States will be able to stand firm in the 
battle. The conference has, therefore, decided to resume the pumping of oil, since oil is a positive 
Arab resource that can be used in the service o f Arab goals. It can contribute to the efforts to 
enable those Arab States which were exposed to the aggression and thereby lost economic 
resources to stand firm and eliminate the effects o f the aggression. The oilproducing States have, in 
fact, participated in the efforts to enable the States affected by the aggression to stand firm in the 
face of any economic pressure.
5. The participants in the conference have approved the plan proposed by Kuwait to set up an Arab 
Economic and Social Development Fund on the basis o f  the recommendation o f the Baghdad 
conference of Arab Ministers of Finance, Economy and Oil.
6. The participants have agreed on the need to adopt the necessary measures to strengthen military 
preparation to face all eventualities.
7. The conference has decided to expedite the elimination of foreign bases in the Arab States.




During the escalation of the War of Attrition launched by Nasser in 1969, the US 
Secretary of State Rogers put forward, on June 19, the proposal. The proposal had 
three parts:
1. A three months ceasefire on the Egyptian front; 2. A statement by Israel, Egypt, and 
Jordan that they accept UNSCR 242, and specifically the call for “withdrawal from 
occupied territories;” 3. An undertaking form Israel to negotiate with Egypt and 
Jordan under Dr. Jarring (special UN envoy to the region) auspices as soon as the 
ceasefire came into force.
The proposal also contained an important provision for a “stand-still” during the 
ceasefire: neither Egypt nor Israel would be allowed to move its missiles closer to the 
Canal.
Source: Shlaim, 2004: 295
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Appendix 5
UNSC Resolution 338 22 October 1973
Following the 1973 October War, the United Nations Security Council adopted 
Resolution 338 which called fo r  a ceasefire as well as implementation o f UNSCR 242
The Security Council
1. Calls upon all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all 
military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption 
of this decision, in the position they now occupy;
2. Calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the ceasefire the 
implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts;
3. Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the ceasefire, negotiations start 
between the parties concerned under the appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a 




The mini-summit meeting in Rivad was attended by King Khalid, the Kuwaiti Emir, 
Presidents Sadat, Sarkis, and Asad, and Arafat. The two-day meeting of the main 
parties concerned in Lebanon and the core Arab actors produced an overall agreement, 
ostensibly responding to the demands of both Lebanon and the PLO. The peace plan 
for Lebanon entailed a ceasefire and the creation of a Syrian-dominated “Arab 
Deterrence Force” (ADF) of 30 000 troops, to be subordinated to the president of 
Lebanon.
The mini-summit’s main result lay in the renewal of understanding between Asad and 
Sadat. The meeting also highlighted the decisive weight of the Egyptian-Saudi-Syrian 
coalition in the Arab world, in marked contrast to the weakness of the rejectionist 
states-lraq, Algeria and Libya- which responded with ineffectual protests and the 
dispatch of minister-level delegates to the Cairo summit (which followed Riyad). The 
agreement reached in Riyad served as a basis for a detailed draft proposal submitted to 
the full summit in Cairo for the creation, arming and funding of the ADF. The summit 
also set up a fund to underwrite the ADF, the bulk of which was comprised of Syrian 
forces.
Source: Sela, 1998: 185-186
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Appendix 7
Summit in Cairo, October 25-26, 1976
1. Confirmation of the plan for a peace settlement in Lebanon concluded by the 
Riyad mini-summit, including the establishment of the “Arab Deterrence Force.”
2. Renewal of the Arab financial aid to the confrontation states and the PLO.
3. Extending financial aid to Lebanon for its economic rehabilitation.
4. Reassertion of the Arab commitment to support the PLO’s right to establish its 
“independent state on its national land.”
Source: Sela, 1998
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Saudi Crown Prince Fahd Eight Points Peace Plan, August 7,1981
Appendix 8
1. Israel to withdraw from all Arab territory occupied in 1967. including Arab 
Jerusalem.
2. Israeli settlements built on Arab land after 1967 to be dismantled, including those in 
Arab Jerusalem.
3. A guarantee of freedom of worship for all religions in the Holy Places.
4. An affirmation of the right of the Palestinian Arab people to return to their homes 
and compensation for those who do not wish to return.
5. The West Bank and the Gaza Strip to have a transitional period under the auspices 
of the United Nations for a period not exceeding several months.
6. An independent Palestinian State should be set up with Jerusalem as its capital.
7. All States in the region should be able to live in peace in the region.
8. The United Nations or Member States of the United Nations to guarantee the 
carrying out of these provisions.
Source: Jewish Virtual Library
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Appendix 9
The Declaration of Principle on Interim Agreement Self-Government for the 
Palestinians (Israeli-PLO peace accord)
On September 13, 1993 Israel and the PLO signed the Declaration of Principles (also 
called Oslo Accords), where the two sides defined the bases for their future relations 
based on mutual recognition, timeframes for implementation of the points mentioned 
in the Declaration and the approaches towards the realization of the idea of the 
Palestinian State.
The highlights of the agreement were as follows:
• A five-year period of limited autonomy for Palestinians in the occupied territories
• A withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza and the Jericho section of the West Bank 
and the establishment of Palestinian control of internal affairs in these areas within 
four months (with Jewish settlements there remaining under Israeli control)
• Palestinian elections in the occupied territories to create a governing body to be 
known as the Palestinian Authority (the embryo of a future Palestinian state)
• The creation of Israeli financial support for economic development in Gaza and the 
West Bank
Source: McWilliams, Piotrowski, 2001: 162
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Appendix 10
Beirut Declaration, March 28,2002 (final communiqué, extracts)
We, the kings, presidents, and emirs of the Arab states meeting in the Council of the Arab League 
Summit in Beirut, capital of Lebanon... have conducted a thorough assessment of the developments and 
challenges... relating to the Arab region and, more specifically, to the occupied Palestinian territory.
With great pride, we followed the Palestinian people's intifada and valiant resistance. We discussed the 
Arab initiatives that aim to achieve a just and comprehensive peace in the region. ..
Based on the pan-Arab responsibility, and . . .the objectives of the Arab League Charter, the UN Charter, 
we announce the following:
We will continue to ...protect the pan-Arab security and fend off the foreign schemes that aim to 
encroach on Arab territorial integrity.
We address a greeting of pride and honour to the Palestinian people's steadfastness and valiant intifada 
against the Israeli occupation and its destructive war machine.
We greet with honour and pride the valiant martyrs of the intifada...
We affirm solidarity with Lebanon to complete the liberation of its territory and pledge to extend aid to 
help its development and the reconstruction process.
We take pride in the Lebanese resistance and the outstanding Lebanese steadfastness that led to the 
withdrawal of the Israeli forces from the major part of South Lebanon and western Al-Biqa. We demand 
the release of the Lebanese prisoners, who are held in Israeli jails...
We emphasize our solidarity with Syria and Lebanon in the face of the Israeli aggressive threats that will 
undermine security and stability in the region.
We reaffirm that peace in the Middle East cannot succeed unless it is just and comprehensive... and 
based on the land for peace principle.
Expectations from Israel
A. Complete withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories, including the Syrian Golan Heights, to the 4 
June 1967 line and the territories still occupied in southern Lebanon.
B. Attain a just solution to the problem of Palestinian refugees to be agreed upon in accordance with the 
UN General Assembly Resolution No 194.
C. Accept the establishment of an independent and sovereign Palestinian state on the Palestinian 
territories occupied since 4 June 1967 in the West Bank and Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its 
capital.
In return the Arab states will do the following:
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Consider the Arab-Israeli conflict over, sign a peace agreement with Israel, and achieve peace for all 
states in the region
Establish normal relations with Israel within the framework of this comprehensive peace
The Council welcomes the assurances by the Republic of Iraq that it will respect the independence, 
sovereignty, and security of the state of Kuwait and safeguard its territorial integrity.
Within the same framework, the leaders emphasize the importance of suspending media campaigns and 
negative statements to create a positive atmosphere....
The Council calls for respecting Iraq's independence, sovereignty, security, territorial integrity, and 
regional safety.
The Council calls on Iraq to cooperate in seeking a... definitive solution to the issue of the Kuwaiti 
prisoners and detainees and returning [Kuwaiti] properties.
The Council also calls on Kuwait to cooperate with what Iraq offers with respect to its nationals who are 
reported as missing through the International Committee of the Red Cross.
The Council welcomes the resumption of the dialogue between Iraq and the United Nations...
The Council calls for lifting the sanctions on Iraq and ending the tribulation of the fraternal Iraqi 
people...
The Council rejects threats of aggression against some Arab states, particularly Iraq, and reiterates 




“Syria’s Veto Power” is referred to the Syrian preventive policy in light of the Israeli 
achievements after the war in Lebanon in 1982, and the subsequent American 
initiative for peace, which confronted the Syrian interests of security, regional 
domination. In order to fulfill those interests Syria needed the dominant position and 
control in Lebanon, which had been undermined by Israeli and American actions and 
even isolated Syria’s role in the Arab core issues such as Palestinian problem. To 
avoid those negative outcomes for itself Syria took up the destructive policy in 
Lebanon and the peace process in general in the next three years that followed. Like 
this Syria assumed the unique role as the only actively fighting state in the Arab- 
Israeli conflict and as the leader of the radical bloc. Thus, within two years Syria 
managed to regain the initiative in Lebanon, force Israel’s withdrawal, and restore 
itself as the dominant power in the country. Syria could not afford any external 
intervention in Lebanon as the contradiction to its security needs. This obliged Syria to 
reduce Israeli influence in Lebanon and undercut the threat to its own security. To 
realize these goals Syria was ready to use any means or measures, combining political 
intrigues, terrorism and assassination, guerilla warfare, and even the use of regular 
forces. It used the Lebanese and Palestinian proxies in order to minimize the risk of 
direct clash with Israel or the United States. Avoiding direct responsibility for striking 
at Palestinian or other Arab targets also limited potential domestic political fallout. 
Major “veto power” aim was to contain the Maronite-based Lebanese government, 
facilitated by Israel, and the PLO, and to force Western intervention forces and Israel 
to withdraw from Lebanon.
Note 1:




Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu who came to power after 1996 elections is 
considered to be the main deteriorating factor of the peace process set out at Oslo, for 
he refused to implement the commitment of the accords. He demolished Palestinian 
homes, authorized the building of additional Jewish settlements and Jewish-only 
access roads in the West Bank, and delayed the previously-agreed upon withdrawal of 
Israeli troops from Hebron.
In September 1996, Netanyahu sent a message that Israel alone was sovereign in 
Jerusalem and that the Palestinians had no choice but to accept what the Israeli 
government was meting out. He opened the tunnel that ran into the heart of East 
Jerusalem along the Temple Mount, on which rested two sacred shrines of Islam- the 
Dome of the Rock and the Al-Aqsa Mosque.
Netanyahu showed scant interest in completing the Oslo process. Israel had granted 
the Palestinian Authority under Arafat only 12 per cent of the West Bank, but the land 
consisted of enclaves that were not viable economically and surrounded by borders 
and roads controlled by the Israeli Defense Forces. Israel continued to build 
settlements in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem. Between September 1993 
and December 2000, settlement construction had increased by more than 50 per cent, 
the settler population by 72 per cent. The overall settler population reached 380, 000 
amid 3.4 million Palestinians. In February 2000, the Egyptian president Hosni 
Mubarak warned that Palestine had become a time-bomb.




Officially the initiation of the second Intifada is considered to be the provocative move 
by Israeli politician Ariel Sharon. On September 28, 2000 heavily guarded by Israeli 
soldiers and police-men, he walked into Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem, the third 
holiest site in Islam; fighting broke out between the Palestinians and security forces 
guarding Sharon.
This Intifada pitied mostly young Palestinians against Israeli soldiers and citizens. By 
the end of 2000, over 350- the vast majority of Palestinians- had died in deadly clashes 
throughout the land. Second Intidada is considered to be of a larger scale than the 
Intifada of 1987.
This was an expression of a deep disappointment and frustration over the ongoing 
disrespect and denial of basic rights for Palestinians caused by the occupation 
including the right to free access to Jerusalem, security and development, and the 
refugees’ right to return. In the wake of continuing violence, hopes of a final peace 
agreement were abandoned. Most Palestinians saw the outbreak of the confrontations 
as an inevitable result of repressive occupation and a “peace process” leading 
nowhere.
Besides, it featured the cruel actions of extremist groupings such as Hamas, and 
Martyre Brigade, which exacerbated the already dire situation
Source: ww vv.aliazeera.net; McWilliams, Piotrowski, 2001: 169
108
Note 4:
Levant is a part of the sub-regional system constituting the Arab world. It is referred to 
the Fertile Crescent, comprised of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Palestine.
Source: Miller, 1986; Sela, 1998.
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